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Articles
Maximizing Autonomy in the Shadow of
Great Powers: The Political Economy of
Sovereign Wealth Funds
KYLE HATTON*

& KATHARINA PISTOR**

Sovereign wealth funds ("SWFs") have received a
great deal of attention since they appearedas critical
investors during the globalfinancial crisis. Reactions
have rangedfrom fears of state intervention and mercantilism to hopes that SWFs will emerge as model
long-term investors that will take on risky investments
in green technology and infrastructure that few private investors are willing to touch. In this paper we
argue that both of these reactions overlook the fact
that SWFs are deeply embedded in the political economy of their respective sovereign sponsors. This paperfocuses on fourpolitical entities that sponsor some
of the largest SWFs worldwide: Kuwait, Abu Dhabi,
Singapore and China. Each of them has been governed for decades by elites whose grip on power has
been tied to the economic fortune of their respective
economies and their ability to pacify, or at least balance against,foreign powers. We argue that for these
four politicalentities, both the motives for establishing
SWFs and the strategies they employ can best be explained by an "autonomy-maximization" theory.

*
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In a world where uncertainty-both economic andpolitical-looms larger as a concern in the wake of the
globalfinancialcrisis and political upheavals, such as
the revolutions in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, elites use
an increasingly diverse array of tools to protect their
autonomy within the global system and hedge against
unexpected turmoil. SWFs serve ruling elites by concentrating substantialresources, which can be used to
pay off domestic adversaries, to insure the economy
against major downturns and thereby mitigate public
discontent, to signal cooperation to major foreign
powers and to increase legitimacy in the global arena
by presenting governance structures familiar to the
West. We employ a comparative case study analysis
to highlight the critical importance of these political
economy dynamics in the establishment of SWFs, their
governance structures and their behavior in both
normal times and during times of crisis.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Sovereign wealth funds ("SWFs") have drawn increased scrutiny in recent years due to high-profile acquisitions of equity stakes
in Western companies; however, most of these funds have quietly invested public wealth in diversified global portfolios for decades.
Lately, heightened concerns about national security interests have led
to increased filings and investigations by the Committee on Foreign
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Investment in the United States (CFIUS), 1 but the more common reaction to the expanded role of SWFs in the global financial system
among the general public is a kind of collective unease. At the center
of this unease is the opacity of SWFs' institutional structures, strategies and goals: it is difficult to rely comfortably on partners whose
motives are unclear.
Accordingly, much debate in academic circles has emerged
about the motives of SWFs. From the alarmist camp, some have
sounded warnings that SWFs portend the return of mercantilism to
the global economy while others have argued that they evidence the
rise of a new form of socialism or imperialist-capitalism in emerging
economies. This anxiety is fueled by the fact that many SWFs tend
to come from countries that are non-democratic. On the other side,
SWF apologists steadfastly maintain that these institutions are classic
examples of rational market investors. We believe that these explanations are lacking, in no small part because they attempt to reduce
SWFs to terms with which Western audiences are familiar in order to
elicit either protectionist or free market policy responses.
In contrast, we characterize SWFs as autonomy-maximizing
institutions. 2 In each of the countries analyzed herein, the ruling elite
utilize SWFs to secure their domestic political dominance against
both internal and external threats. While this interest is furthered by
wealth-maximizing choices in most instances, SWFs are not wholly
neutral market actors; however, neither are they bent on imposing the
policies of their sovereign sponsors on the international system.
This article first summarizes and briefly explains the existing
accounts of SWF motives along with the term "autonomymaximizer," while showing that only the autonomy-maximizing story
can fully explain SWF actions since their inception. Then, case studies of SWFs in Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, Singapore and China are pre1. From 2006 to 2008, filings increased by about forty percent from 111 to 155, and
investigations increased from 7 to 23. COMM. ON FOREIGN INV. IN THE U.S., COMM. ON
FOREIGN INV. IN THE U.S. ANNUAL REP. TO CONG. (Public/Unclassified Version) 3 (2009),
available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/international-affairs/cfius/docs/20090/"20CFIUS

%20Annual%20Report.pdf.
2.

The notion that SWFs are autonomy-maximizers is similar, but not identical to the

argument made by Dixon and Monk that SWFs are used to maximize the sovereignty of the
state sponsor. Adam Dixon & Ashby H.B. Monk, Rethinking the Sovereign in Sovereign
Wealth Funds (Aug. 3, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/

so13/papers.cfin?abstract id=1652701. Dixon and Monk argue that SWFs improve the
"sovereignty deficit [of some states] vis-A-vis more powerful states," enhance "a [state's]
international legal sovereignty" and further states' domestic "Westphalian sovereignty." Id.
at 9, 11. We will distinguish these positions more carefully below under ll.B.
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sented to ground the autonomy-maximization theory in reality.
These case studies confirm that SWFs are used to maximize the autonomy of their sovereign sponsor and that this objective is quite
consistent with each country's behavior prior to its formation of
SWFs. Finally, a theoretical argument is provided as to why SWFs
are appropriate institutions for advancing this goal.
II. THEORY

SWFs have been defined as "government-owned and
-controlled (directly or indirectly) investment funds that have no outside beneficiaries or liabilities (beyond the government or the citizenry in abstract) and that invest their assets, either in the short or long
term, according to the interests and objectives of the sovereign sponsor."' 3 This definition is indicative in that it draws a clear connection
between the actions of SWFs (investment) and the motives of the
sovereign sponsor. SWFs have accumulated vast pools of capital, so
identifying these interests and objectives is critical for other actors in
the global economic governance system who need to determine
whether SWFs are reliable partners. Accurately identifying sovereign goals and objectives is, however, problematic: any self-reported
disclosure must be viewed skeptically, the well-documented historical opacity of SWFs tends to frustrate independent investigation and
many investment decisions may be consistent with multiple characterizations of the underlying SWF motive.
Existing scholarly debate has attempted to explain SWF actions through several competing theoretical frameworks. Some have
theorized that SWFs are rational market actors which maximize financial returns-and thus reliable partners-while others argue that
SWFs are exploitative institutions-and thus not to be trustedalternatively characterizing them as mercantilist, socialist-imperialist
or capitalist-imperialist institutions. This is, however, a false dichotomy: it is possible to act in a manner that is neither financial-returnmaximizing nor exploitative. Further, none of the existing characterizations can adequately explain the full range of observed SWF behavior. Based on detailed comparative analysis of the leading SWFs
3. Ashby H.B. Monk, Recasting the Sovereign Wealth Fund Debate:
Trust,
Legitimacy, and Governance 10 (May 1, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 134862.
Of course, by extension,
SWFs may be liable and responsive to the population at large insofar as the sovereign is
accountable to the nation. Given that many SWFs are sponsored by non-democratic
governments, however, even this indirect accountability is questionable.
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in the world and their role within the systems that sponsor them, we
argue that SWFs are autonomy-maximizing institutions. Autonomymaximization is consistent with the circumstances that led to the creation of SWFs in each of the case study countries and can explain
SWFs' historically passive external investment strategy, the politicized nature of their domestic investments, the use of SWF revenues
to pacify domestic constituencies, their dollar recycling function and
the extraordinary investments made by SWFs during the recent financial crisis.
A brief explanation of each of the existing alternative theories
is provided below, followed by an analysis of whether these theories
can explain each of the behaviors listed above. We then provide an
overview of our autonomy-maximizing theory, along with an analysis showing how it does explain each of these behaviors.
A. Existing Alternative Explanations
There are three primary existing theories of SWF objectives
and motivations. The first theory is that SWFs are mercantilist (or
neo-mercantilist) institutions. The second theory is that SWFs act as
capitalist-imperialist (or socialist-imperialist) institutions.
SWF
apologists, in contrast, argue that they are rational market-based investors. None of these theories explains the full breadth of SWF behavior; indeed, some would predict behavior quite contrary to that
actually observed over the last twenty years.
In the classic sense, mercantilism proceeds from an assumption that economic exchanges are a zero-sum game and that accumulation of capital marks the winner. 4 Between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the governments of the emergent nation states in
Europe believed that by regulating their economies they could enhance their geopolitical power. Adam Smith was highly skeptical of
the concept and advocated free trade as a superior way to foster prosperity. 5 Professors Gilson and Milhaupt have characterized SWFs as
neo-mercantilist institutions that use "company-level behavior" to
maximize "country-level . . . economic, social, and political benefits."'6 According to this theory, SWF actions should be aimed at

4. See, e.g.,

THOMAS MUN, ENGLAND'S TREASURE BY FORRAIGN TRADE

(1664);

STEUART, AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1770); see
HALLIDAY, ARABIA WITHOUT SULTANS 464 (1974).

JAMES

also FRANK

5. See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 488 (University of Chicago Press
1976) (1776).
6. Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milbaupt, Sovereign Wealth Funds"and Corporate
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country-level maximization of these benefits. Gilson and Milhaupt
present little concrete support for this characterization beyond a passing reference to the Chinese economy and an observation that SWFs
constitute "state involvement in the economy."'7 While Chinese trade
policy may have mercantilist tendencies, 8 this does not necessarily
prove that all SWFs (or even the Chinese Investment Corporation)
act out of mercantilist impulses. The analysis below shows that a
significant portion of SWFs' behavior is not explainable by countrylevel economic, social and political benefit maximization.
Post-mercantilist state involvement in the economy has been
alternatively explained by imperialist-capitalism. While capitalism is
based on private ownership of the means of production, imperialistcapitalism means that governments become deeply involved in directing investments overseas in an attempt to marry their own interests with those of the economic elites. Essentially, the argument as
developed by Max Weber is that higher profits are available outside
of domestic markets and that by capturing these profits through the
use of imperialist force, states can boost the expansion of their domestic economies more rapidly than through pacifist "free-trade"
capitalism alone. 9 Heike Schweitzer explains that if SWFs are indeed imperialist-capitalist institutions, they should be trying to exploit the capitalist system for their own economic and political benefit.10 Upon inspection, however, it is apparent that SWFs are neither
"turning the tables" of imperialist force against Western economies
nor engaging in imperialist behavior in developing states; further, the
imperialist-capitalist theory does not explain several key categories
of SWFs' historical actions.
The final existing theory on SWFs is that they are pure market-based rational investors. In the neoclassical model of economic
organization, rational actors seek to maximize their interestsprimarily profits. 1' While most proponents of the market economy

Governance: A Minimalist Response to the New Mercantilism,60 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1346
(2008).
7.

Id.

8. For an argument that China's policy is mercantilist, see Robert J. Samuelson,
China's Wrong Turn on Trade, NEWSWEEK, May 14, 2007, at 55.
9. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 918 20 (University of California Press
1978) (1921).
10. Heike Schweitzer, Sovereign Wealth Funds:
Capitalists,2 EUR. Y.B. INT'L ECON. L. 80 (2011).

Market Investors or Imperialist-

11. For a discussion of the homo economicus concept in historical perspective, see
Bruce Carruthers, Homo Economicus and Homo Politicus: Non-Economic Rationality in
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would argue that private actors are the agents best suited to the system, an argument can be made that in highly competitive markets, actors with different ownership structures or objective functions will
largely converge in their outlook and behavior to conform to demands of the market economy. 12 This is uniformly the motivation
SWFs themselves declare; 13 it is echoed by numerous commentators 14 and is presented by Epstein and Rose as a prudent default assumption due to the lack of contradictory evidence.' 5 Under this theory, SWFs should act to maximize the financial gains accruing to the
SWF-similarly to how a "normal" investor would structure its behavior. While the wealth-maximizing explanation explains certain
SWF actions, it cannot explain others without assuming that SWFs
are occasionally completely irrational or that they represent "dumb
money" in the marketplace.
We believe that any theory of SWF motivation should be able
to explain five particular courses of action that SWFs have undertaken in the past. The following table presents a summary of our analysis, which is detailed below.

the Early 18th Century London Stock Market, 37 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 165 (1994).
12. This line of thinking has motivated the liberalization of markets in the former
socialist world as a means to develop efficient markets even before privatization and other
institutional reforms had been completed. For a discussion of the sequence of privatization
and market reforms, see Andrzej Rapaczynski, The Role of the State and the Market in
EstablishingPropertyRights, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 87 (1996). But see Justin Y. Lin, Viability,
Economic Transition and Reflection on Neoclassical Economics, 58 KYKLOS 239 (2005)
(arguing that non-viable firms will not function in a competitive market economy).
13.

See, e.g., TEMASEK HOLDINGS, TEMASEK REPORT 2010: MAKING A DIFFERENCE 5

(2010) ("Temasek Holdings is an investment company managed on commercial principles to
create and deliver sustainable long-term value for our stakeholders."), available at
http://www.temasekholdings.com.sg/pdf/temasek-review/TR201O0.pdf;
Mission
and
Principles,KUWAIT INV. AUTH., http://www.kia.gov.kw/En/AboutKIA/MissionPrinciples/
Pages/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 16, 2011) ("[The Kuwait Investment Authority's
("KIA")] mission is to achieve long term investment returns on the financial reserves of the
State of Kuwait .... ");CHINA INV. CORP., ANNUAL REP. 2010, at 1 (2010) ("[China
Investment Corporation's] mission is to make long-term investments to maximize risk
adjusted financial returns for the benefit of the shareholder."),
available at
http://www.china-inv.cn/cicen/include/resources/CIC_2010-annualreport-en.pdf;
Guiding
Principles, ABU DHABI INV. AUTH., http://www.adia.ae/en/About/Guiding-Principles.aspx
(last visited Sept. 16, 2011) ("ADIA's decisions are based solely on its economic objectives
of delivering sustained long-term financial returns.").
14. See Eric Langland, Misplaced Fears Put to Rest: Financial Crisis Reveals the
True Motives ofSovereign Wealth Funds, 18 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 263 (Winter 2009).
15. Richard A. Epstein & Amanda M. Rose, The Regulation of Sovereign Wealth
Funds: The Virtues of Going Slow, 76 U. CHI. L. REv. 111, 113-14 (2009).
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One of the trademarks of SWF behavior over the past thirty
years has been passive foreign direct investment.1 6 Certainly, SWFs
have sought influence on the boards of some of their investment targets, but in the large majority of cases, SWF wealth is employed passively. This is not consistent with the pursuit of a mercantilist agenda. Passive investments in Western corporations allocate capital to
corporations that maximize wealth at the company level; mercantilist
SWFs would need either to successfully influence corporate boards
to act in ways that benefit the sovereign sponsor at the expense of
other investors (for which there is no evidence to date, and which is
unlikely to occur in the future given strong penalties levied against
directors who violate the duty of loyalty), 17 or to purchase large
stakes in companies such that company-level wealth maximization
results in de facto country-level wealth maximization. Mercantilism,
therefore, does not explain why SWFs predominantly invest passively. Imperialist-capitalism, too, fails to provide an explanation for
SWFs' historical passive investment strategy. Passive investment

16. For a comprehensive study on past investment patterns of SWFs, see MONITOR
GROUP, ASSESSING THE RISKS:

THE BEHAVIORS OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS IN THE

GLOBAL ECONOMY (2008).
17.

The duty of loyalty is part of the fiduciary duties in U.S. corporate law. However,

other countries sanction conflicted transactions as well. For a comparative perspective, see
Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Fiduciary Duties in Transitional Civil Law
Jurisdictions: Lessons from the Incompleteness of Law Theory, in GLOBAL MARKETS,
DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS:

CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN A NEW ERA OF CROSS-

BORDER DEALS 77 (Curtis Milhaupt ed., 2003).
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strategies simply do not fit with an "exploitative" agenda, nor do they
serve to bend host-country industrial policy to benefit the SWF sovereign sponsor. The market-investor theory does explain SWFs' passive investment strategy, as the cost advantages of a passive strategy
are well-documented.
SWFs' investments in Western financial institutions during
the recent financial crisis were heavily publicized and caused great
concern in many circles. 18 None of the existing theories, however,
offers an adequate explanation for why SWFs made these investments. Almost uniformly, the investments included passivity clauses, specifying that the investments created "no special rights of ownership," "no role in the management of the company," "no right to
designate a member ... of the Board of Directors" or "[no] special
governance rights."'19 This passivity, as noted above, is inconsistent
with either a mercantilist or imperialist-capitalist agenda. Further,
some of these investments (particularly those from Gulf states) were
undertaken after U.S. officials visited political entities that sponsor
SWFs to "persuade" them to contribute to the global bailout.20 Clearly, imperialist pressure was not being exerted by the SWFs looking to
exploit Western markets; it was more likely exerted against them to
force the recapitalization of Western-controlled financial institutions
using SWF cash. Therefore, the imperialist-capitalist theory cannot
explain these extraordinary investments.
Mercantilism also fails to provide an explanation for extraordinary investments during the financial crisis. These recapitalizations were all made during a period of extreme uncertainty: conservative mercantilists would have disinvested from risky financial
institutions fearing the loss of capital, while aggressive risk-taking
mercantilists would have demanded large returns in exchange for
their investments. The evidence, however, shows that SWFs did not
disinvest-instead, they increased their investments in risky Western
financials during the crisis. 21 While some have since cut back their
18. Lawrence Summers, who later became economic advisor to the Obama
administration, opined that the "logic of the capitalist system" of shareholders maximizing
value is "far from obvious" in the case of SWF investments in foreign companies. Lawrence
Summers, Sovereign Funds Shake the Logic of Capitalism, FIN. TIMES, July 30, 2007, at 9.
19. Paul Rose, Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment in the Shadow (?f Regulation and
Politics,40 GEO. J. INT'L L. 1207, 1231 35 (2009).
20. For a detailed account of one such bailout, see Katharina Pistor, Global Network
Finance: Institutional Innovation in the Global FinancialMarketplace, 37 J. COMp. ECON.
552, 565 (2009).
21.

Id. at 558. For a more updated account, see Katharina Pistor, Sovereign Wealth

Funds and Global Financial Governance,in SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS AND FOREIGN
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investments, they did so only after the urgency of the global financial
crisis had subsided. 22 They also did not extract disproportionate benefits: they tended to act like cooperative players in the global economic governance system. The convertible bonds they purchased
were preferred relative to those purchased by other equity investors,
but were subordinated to later investments made by the U.S. government;
also, most SWFs converted their bonds to common shares early 23-which is inconsistent with the country-level maximization story.
SWF investments in Western financial institutions during the
crisis cannot be easily explained as the actions of a rational market
investor. While some have argued that investing in vulnerable institutions and subsequent disinvestment in favor of more conservative
instruments is perfectly consistent with the rational market investor
theory, 24 this ignores the particulars of the investments themselves.

When the SWFs invested in Western financial intermediaries, such as
Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch ("Merrill"), Citigroup or UBS, share
prices had already plummeted, and it was fairly clear among sophisticated investors that the bottom could not be identified because exposure to sub-prime mortgages was unknown. 25 Other large players
in the financial system were refusing to invest in the financials under
any terms. 26 In this environment, SWFs made huge investments concentrated in particular Western financials rather than spreading the
investment across the industry (contrary to their normal investment

DIRECT INVESTMENT (Karl Sauvant ed., forthcoming 2012).

22. Pistor, supranote 20, at 557.
23. Id. at 554, tbl.1. One example discussed is the additional capital injection China
Investment Corporation gave Morgan Stanley to pay back the TARP money to the U.S.
government.
24. Langland, supra note 14, at 265.
25. Indeed, the reason financial intermediaries turned to SWFs was that they were
unable to secure sufficient funds to recapitalize at the time. Note also that Barclays, a bank
that had largely escaped the problems associated with asset-backed securities, tried to launch
a public offer in the summer of 2008. That offer was heavily undersubscribed. Only
commitments secured from sovereign investors (e.g., Temasek, China Development Bank
and Qatar Investment Authority) to acquire the unsubscribed share ensured that the capital
increase succeeded. When Barclays needed more funds in the fall of 2008, it therefore went
straight to sovereign investors. For details, see generally Pistor, supra note 20.
26. While SWFs do benefit from favorable tax treatment in the United States, see
I.R.C. § 892 (2011), such that they should value U.S. equities more highly than either
domestic investors or foreign private investors do, see Victor Fleischer, A Theory qf Taxing
Sovereign Wealth, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 442 (2009), the complete lack of interest from
non-sovereign sources suggests that a simple valuation gap was not the sole explanation.
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patterns) and made the investment decisions extremely quickly. For
example, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority ("ADIA") invested
billions in Citigroup less than forty-eight hours after a visit from
Robert Rubin-former U.S. Treasury Secretary and then-director at
Citigroup. Further, the fact that all SWFs incurred large losses as the
result of these investments weighs against the market investor theory:
either they were easily misled "dumb money" or they had some other
common reason to invest in Western financials beyond financial returns. Given that SWFs have historically performed well, 27 we reject
the "dumb money" explanation and instead conclude that the SWFs
are not always market investors.
Another important attribute of SWFs is that they recycle dollars from Eastern exporters to the West. 28 This is consistent with an
imperialist-capitalist theory but inconsistent with the other two theories. Imperialist-capitalists should prefer equities in foreign markets
to secure influence abroad and dollar recycling is consistent with this
behavior. Mercantilism, however, favors the accumulation of capital
inside national borders, so sending large quantities of the international reserve currency back to the West would be anathema to mercantilist goals. Market investors should invest in the highest-returning
opportunities available and diversify against currency risks; SWFs,
however, are heavily invested in dollar-denominated assets to the extent that they are overexposed to the dollar. 29 Therefore, neither the
mercantilism theory nor the market investor theory provides an explanation for why SWFs so consistently recycle dollars to the West.
SWFs also use their funds to pacify domestic constituencies.
In some countries, new SWFs have been established to expand the
institutional space such that potential rivals for political authority are
placated. 30 In other countries, the proceeds of investments have been
used to fund current government expenditures during times of cri27. It is difficult to get an accurate account of their performance because only a few
SWFs make their performance data publicly available. However, a careful assessment of the
performance of SWFs prior to the global financial crisis shows that SWFs have highly
diversified portfolios, invest in the long term and frequently invest in slightly riskier assets
than the average institutional investor. The assessment was conducted by Monitor, a
Boston-based consulting group, and was based on transactions for which public information
is available (i.e., when they invest in securities that are registered and reported on). See
MONITOR GROUP, supra note 16, at 33, 35-40, 56, 70.
28.

See infi-a Part III.C (discussing the SWFs of Singapore).

29. This follows largely from the fact that they use foreign exchange earnings from oil
exports and consumer product exports to finance their investments. For details, see in/hz
Part I (analyzing the origins and behavior of SWFs in case studies).
30.

See, e.g., in/ra Part I1I.B (analyzing SWFs in Abu Dhabi).
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sis.31 None of the existing theories can explain this behavior. Mercantilist institutions should maximize country-level benefits-not allocate benefits within the country to preferred groups. The allocation
of funds domestically is beyond the scope of imperialist-capitalist
theory, but to the extent that these institutions should be seeking to
maximize profit by taking advantage of opportunities outside the
domestic economy, the use of funds inside the SWF sovereign sponsor is inconsistent with expected behaviors. Lastly, the market investor theory does not explain this behavior either. Market investors
would neither allocate fund-management responsibilities based on
political concerns nor draw down capital to fund current expenditures.
Finally, SWFs' domestic investment decisions are sometimes
heavily politicized. SWFs themselves admit that non-financial motivations influence domestic investment decisions. 32 Less publicly,
SWFs often take large minority stakes in domestic companies controlled by members of the existing elite and their allies; SWF-owned
domestic financial institutions also provide extremely favorable lending facilities to the local merchant class on a "name-basis. ' 33 These
actions prey on existing wealth and fail to maximize either countrylevel benefits or financial returns accruing to the SWF.
As shown above, none of the existing theories about SWF ob31.

During the Arab uprising of 2011, for example, Saudi Arabia launched a $35

billion program for domestic investment to appease its population. See Abeer Allam, Saudi
'Royal Gif'

Fails to Woo Activists, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.ft.com/

intl/cms/s/0/b02fl ffa-3f62-11 eO-8e48-00144feabdc0.html#axzz 1Y2YES2sX.
32. Economic diversification, creation of employment opportunities for nationals and
economic development all play into domestic investments. Even the lauded Norwegian
Government Pension Fund explicitly invests according to a political agenda: it will not
invest in weapons manufacturers, alcohol or tobacco producers, or firms that do not meet its
labor

relations

OBSERVATION

standards.

NORWEGIAN

AND EXCLUSION

GOV'T PENSION FUND, GUIDELINES

OF COMPANIES FROM

THE GOVERNMENT

FOR THE

PENSION

FUND

GLOBAL'S INVESTMENT UNIVERSE § 2 (2010), available at http://www.regjeringen.no/en/sub

/styrer-rad-utvalg/ethics-council/ethical-guidelines.html?id

425277.

33. For an example of the consequences of loose lending policies like "name-lending,"
see the massive write-downs by numerous SWF-controlled Middle Eastern banking
institutions occasioned by the collapse of the Saad Group in 2009, Delaults: Islamic
Finance in
Uncharted Territory, REUTERS, Nov.
5,
2009, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/11/05/islamic-defaults-idUSKJLR44503820091105, and
the subsequent backstopping of those banks by SWF sovereign sponsors' deposits,
particularly by increasing the level of government cash deposited in troubled banks. See
Government Deposits ivith Banks up Dh]5bn, EMIRATES 24/7 (Sept. 28, 2010),
http://www.emirates247.com/business/economy-finance/government-deposits-with-banksup-dhl 5bn-2010-09-28-1.296464.
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jectives and motivations explains the breadth of their documented
behavior. SWFs generally adopt a passive and diversified investment
strategy in foreign markets, but they made extraordinary and highly
risky investments in Western financial institutions during the financial crisis. 34 They also recycle dollars to the West, 35 make politicized
domestic investments and use funds to pacify domestic constituencies. 36 Since none of the existing theories can explain all of these behaviors, a full understanding of SWFs requires a new theory about
their institutional interests.
B. Autonomy Maximization

We offer a new theory of SWF objectives and motivations.
We argue that SWFs act to maximize the domestic autonomy of the
ruling elite in the sovereign sponsor. As mentioned above, SWFs are
government-owned and controlled and have no outside beneficiaries
or liabilities beyond the government itself, so they are responsive to
the expressed interests and objectives of the government. There are
competing conceptions of what constitutes "governmental interest" in
a democratic society, but a discussion of public choice versus public
interest politics is beyond the scope of this article. In political entities without representative democracy or where the institutions of
democracy are clearly subordinate to authoritarian rule, such as China, Singapore, 37 Kuwait 38 and Abu Dhabi, the government is comprised of ruling elites who are not directly accountable to the public
in general; it is easy to see how "governmental interest" becomes tied
to the personal interests of the ruling elite. Indeed, the internal governance structures of the SWFs themselves ensure that SWF management is directly accountable to the ruling elite in each sovereign
sponsor. 39 Consequently, it is unsurprising that SWFs can be, and
are, wielded to advance the interests of those elites. First and foremost among these interests is the maintenance of their privileged position, which is characterized by autonomy within the sovereign
sponsor. We argue that SWF actions that are inconsistent with exist34.

See discussion infra pp. 127, 141, 161, 172.

35.

See discussion inira p. 132.

36.

See in/ra pp. 125, 130, 135, 138, 142, 150 n.185, 158, 171.

37. While Singapore's government structure is that of a parliamentary democracy,
functionally it combines authoritarian and democratic institutions to form a hybrid system of
governance sometimes referred to as "non-representative democracy."
38.

In Kuwait, the Parliament is formally subordinate to the Emir.

39.

See in/ra notes 77-79, 138-141, 205-222, 264-276 and accompanying discussion.
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A passive outward investment strategy is consistent with autonomy-maximizing behavior. First, passive investments are less
likely to incur the ire of "more powerful" states-either in the form
of protectionist regulation against foreign investment or more active
interventions into SWF sovereign sponsors-ensuring that Western
capital markets remain open to future SWF investment. Further, insofar as generating wealth is conducive to increasing domestic autonomy, 40 the ability of a passive investment strategy to maximize
wealth is consistent with autonomy-maximization.
The extraordinary investments made by SWFs during the financial crisis are also consistent with the behavior of autonomymaximizing institutions. Among the elite in the Gulf States, there is
an implicit understanding that the security umbrella provided by the
United States is not completely free. Therefore, in order to secure
their continued control over the state in the long term (i.e., to protect
their domestic autonomy), the ruling elite act to meet American demands from time to time. 41 Directing SWF investment toward the
40. Increased wealth provides the existing elites with a greater capacity to buy out
potential rivals and reward their supporters, ensuring their continued autonomy in the
domestic sphere.
41. Consider that even the 1970s oil embargo was, as Halliday puts it, "lifted before
any of the original conditions for its being ended had been met: not an inch of Palestinian
soil had been returned." FRED HALLIDAY, ARABIA WITHOUT SULTANS 20-21 (1974).

He
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rescue of Western financial institutions is quite consistent with protecting long-term autonomy in this sense. 42 Further, if the SWFs had
refused to assist in recapitalizing Western financial institutions, they
might have been rejected as partners in the system of global economic governance, which would have reduced policy options for the elite
in the future.
Dollar recycling, too, is part of a commitment to Western
states, but it is also critical for sustaining the domestic industrial policy choices that the elite in SWF sovereign sponsors have adopted.
For both export and commodity-funded SWFs, a failure to recycle
dollars would reduce Western purchasing power and erode their own
funding streams as export values decline. In the smaller SWF sovereign sponsors, a failure to recycle dollars may even result in Westernbacked regime change. 43 Therefore, SWFs' decisions to concentrate
investments in dollar-denominated assets is consistent with autonomy-maximization.
Autonomy-maximization also explains the use of revenues to
pacify domestic constituencies. The multiplication of SWFs in some
sovereign sponsors provides potentially rivalrous actors within the
sovereign sponsor with large capital pools of their own, aligning their
interests with those of the ruling elite. This improves the security of
the ruling elite, increasing their autonomy, as remaining political rivals will have fewer allies. Further, a drawdown on capital assets
during times of crisis is consistent with autonomy-maximization; by
spending money to meet government payrolls even during emergencies, the ruling elites are able to buy the continued loyalty of the population, improving their own ability to act freely after the end of the

goes on to describe how relations between the Gulf States and the West had moved past the
posturing, and a compromise was apparently struck in which OPEC was allowed to maintain
higher oil prices, but the oil-producing states of the Arabian Peninsula tacitly committed to
investing in the West, purchasing significant amounts of western military equipment and
paying for economic and military assistance from the United States. Id. at 39. For a detailed
account of explicit bargaining between Arab tribal leaders and western powers during World
War I and during the inter-war period, see generally ASKAR H. AL-ENAZY, THE CREATION OF
SAUDI ARABIA: IBN SAUD AND BRITISH IMPERIAL POLICY, 1914- 1927 (2010).
42. Indeed, military exports to non-Chinese SWE sovereign sponsors increased after
the recapitalizations.
See SIPRI Arms Tran,/ar Database, STOCKHOLM INT'L PEACE
RESEARCH INST., http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade-register.php (last visited
Oct. 14, 2011) (recipient register used to generate data).
43. In Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Shakbout's obsession with hoarding gold and refusal to
recycle the proceeds of oil exports back into the global economy led the British to provide
support for the 1966 coup led by his brother, Sheikh Zayed al Nahyan. HALLIDAY, supra
note 41, at 464.
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emergency.
Similarly, the politicized nature of domestic investments can
be explained by autonomy-maximization. Favorable loans and large
minority investments function to buy out potential political rivals, ensuring that they do not enter politics. This ensures that existing elites
have little competition for political power and increases the range of
domestic policy choices that are available without causing political
unrest. Investing domestically in businesses that are labor-intensive
tends to reduce political opposition among the masses. Taking a controlling stake in domestic financial institutions ensures that the existing elite will structure the economic development of the sovereign
sponsor (protecting their autonomy in this area of domestic policy).
Overall, we argue SWF behavior can be explained by our autonomy-maximization theory. Our theory is related to but distinguishable from the sovereignty-maximization theory advanced by
Dixon and Monk. 44 While their theory, like ours, acknowledges that
SWFs are tools that can be used to advance the interests of their
sponsors, 45 in our view they fall somewhat short in completing this
chain of analysis by resting on the "state" as the sponsor. We argue
that the true stakeholders in the SWFs analyzed in this paper are the
ruling elites in the sovereign sponsor, and that as such, it is the interests of these elites that SWFs advance. To these elites, SWFs serve
as a valuable tool for protecting their interests. Limiting the interests
of the ruling elite to state sovereignty, as would be necessary to justify a singular focus on sovereignty-maximization, appears to miss the
complex geopolitical and geoeconomic conditions to which these
elites feel compelled to respond. In fact, one can point to instances
where the elites have been quite willing to compromise on their monopoly on the legitimate use of force within state borders (the key as46
pect of Westphalian sovereignty) but not control over SWFs.

44.

Dixon & Monk, supra note 2.

45.

Id.

46. The most obvious example is the establishment of both semi-permanent military
bases and forward operating locations for the U.S. military in Kuwait, the U.A.E. and
Singapore. See Military Bases Directory, MILITARY AVIATION U.S AIR FORCE, NAVY,
MARINES,

ARMY,

MILITARY

BASES

(Feb.

13,

2011),

http://www.globemaster.de/

regbases.html. Even as Kuwait's al Sabah family pleaded for international forces to restore
it to power in Kuwait during the Gulf War, it retained total control of KIA assets.
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CASE STUDIES

In this section we offer more detailed evidence in support of
our theory drawing on the history and operation of SWFs from the
Gulf States (Abu Dhabi and Kuwait) and the Far East (Singapore and
China). The Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, an organization that
tracks SWFs, 47 currently estimates these entities' SWFs account for
more than half of the assets managed by SWFs worldwide-or about
$2.8 trillion. 48 They also comprise four of the six top SWF sovereign
sponsors as measured by fund size. 49 Saudi Arabia is listed as sponsoring the third-largest SWF, but the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority holds a substantial portion of its funds in low-risk assets, such
as sovereign debt instruments. 50 All four political entities selected
are less than fully democratic 5 1 and as such are representative of the
majority of countries that have sponsored SWFs to date. Indeed, the
only fully democratic country among those sponsoring one of the ten
largest SWFs is Norway.5 2 The political entities selected also exemplify the core funding mechanisms for SWFs: the accumulation of
vast foreign exchange reserves as a result of substantial trade surplus
and/or commodity exports.
A. Kuwait
For hundreds of years, autonomy has been a concern for the
rulers of Kuwait. Situated as it is on the best natural harbor in the
Persian Gulf and surrounded by Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran, the implicit threat of invasion has always loomed large. 53 Further, the royal
position of the al Sabah was secured only by support from tribal
leaders and the merchant class, which significantly constrained royal
47. See Sovereign Wealth Fund Rankings, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND INST., http://
www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2012).
48. Sovereign Wealth Fund Rankings, SWF INST., http://www.swfinstitute.org/fundrankings/ (last updated Dec. 2011).
49.

Id.

50. SAMA Foreign Holdings, SWF INST., http://www.swfinstitute.org/swfs/sanaforeign-holdings/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2012).
51.

See supra notes 37, 38.

52.

Sovereign Wealth FundRankings, supra note 48.

53. The al Sabah have proven that their preferred strategy is seeking out protection
from a Great Power, which provides for effective deterrence while leaving domestic
autonomy basically untouched. For example, this was the bargain that was expressly struck
with the Ottoman and British Empires. See in/ra notes 55-57 and accompanying discussion.
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privileges since both tribes and merchants in the historical Gulf were
highly mobile. 54 Whereas the al Sabah Emir once sent tributary
payments to the Ottomans, 55 guaranteed the safety of British trade
ships 56 and privately bestowed gifts on tribal allies and merchants to
secure royal autonomy, 57 the modem bargain revolves around the allocation of oil revenues.
The creation of a sovereign wealth fund in Kuwait served to
increase the autonomy of the al Sabah family, as did the replacement
of the Kuwait Investment Board with the Kuwait Investment Office
and its later supersession by the Kuwait Investment Authority
("KIA"). The KIA's subsequent actions reflect an objective of autonomy-maximization. The drawdown on KIA funds during the Persian Gulf War, domestic investments in companies owned by the
merchant class and the investments in Citigroup and Merrill Lynch
are all autonomy-maximizing activities.
The Kuwait Investment Authority is the primary sovereign
wealth fund in Kuwait and manages both the Future Generations
Fund ("FGF") and General Revenue Fund ("GRF") for the state.
Both the KIA and its funding are statutorily decreed. Kuwait's FGF
was established by Kuwait's Crown Prince and Finance Minister in
Law Decree Number 106 of 1976, which permanently allocated ten
percent of Kuwait's annual general revenues to the FGF and prohibited any reduction of this percentage or withdrawal of funds from the
account. 58 In 1984, the KIA was created by another royal decree to
manage the FGF and GRF. 59 Both of these decisions were autonomy
maximizing.
The FGF was created in 1976, though the concept of a SWF
54. If the Emir acted against the tribes or merchants, they would simply pack up and
move to the territory of another Emir within the Gulf region-thereby depriving the Emir of
tax revenues and military strength.
55.

See ALAN RUSH, AL SABAH:

HISTORY & GENEALOGY OF KUWAIT'S RULING

FAMILY, 1754-1987, at 176 n. 10 (1 9 8 7 ); see also ROBIN BIDWELL, THE AFFAIRS OF KUWAIT:
1896 1905, at8(1971).
56.

See GOKHAN BACIK, HYBRID SOVEREIGNTY IN THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST:

THE

CASES OF KUWAIT, JORDAN, AND IRAQ 65 (2008).

57.

See MICHAEL S. CASEY, THE HISTORY OF KUWAIT 41 (2007).

58. See the translation of Law Decree No. 106 for the year 1976 concerning the
Reserves for Future Generations, Arts. 1-3 (1976), Overviewt oFunds,KUWAIT INV. AUTH.,
http://www.kia.gov.kw/En/AboutKIA/Overview of Funds/Pages/default.aspx (last visited
Sept. 16, 2011).
59. See History of the KIO, KUWAIT INV. AUTH., http://www.kia.gov.kw/En/KIO/
About/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 20, 2012). KIA is the parent company of the
Kuwait Investment Office (KIO).
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in Kuwait can be traced back to 1953 when the Kuwait Investment
Board ("KIB") was established. 60 The KIB was replaced by the Kuwait Investment Office ("KIO") after Kuwaiti independence in
1961.61 The KIO was created to manage surplus oil revenues, and
62
the FGF was designed for the same function.
One might ask why Kuwait was extracting oil at levels that
would create a budget surplus, but this is outside the scope of this paper. 63 Regardless of the motive, oil revenues must be allocated in
some fashion. It is likely that the fledgling nation of Kuwait would
have happily gone along with the status quo (in which the Emir funded the state apparatus out of his personal coffers, bribed prominent
merchants to stay out of politics and directly collected oil concession
revenues from Western oil companies). The creation of a sovereign
wealth fund, however, maximized the autonomy of the al Sabah relative to other options.
First, separating the private affairs of the ruling family and
the public affairs of the state is a strong signaling mechanism in the
formation of the modem nation-state. If the al Sabah family had continued to deposit oil revenues into their personal bank accounts, then
the international community would not have seen the oil reserves as
"sovereign." Consequently, nationalization of oil reserves would
have been labeled more accurately as private theft and the recogni60. Kuwait Investment Authority, SWF INSTITUTE, http://www.swfinstitute.org/swfs/
kuwait-investment-authority/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2011).
61. See NIGEL ANDREW CHALK ET AL., INT'L MONETARY FUND, KUWAIT: FROM
RECONSTRUCTION TO ACCUMULATION FOR FUTURE GENERATIONS 29 (1997); History of the
K10, supra note 59.
62.

See History q! the KI,

supra note 59.

63. As Halliday points out, it is "irrational for states that [are] unable to absorb their
revenues to produce above a certain level" because oil reserves increase in value as global
supplies diminish-enabling later producers to capture higher profits. FRANK HALLIDAY,
ARABIA WITHOUT SULTANS 421 (1974). For small Gulf States like Kuwait and the U.A.E.,
the oil surplus could not possibly be fully allocated to the government's current accounts
because there was simply not enough to spend it on. It is probably sufficient to note that the
fiscal surpluses enjoyed by the Gulf States are the result of production policies designed to
keep global oil prices low, and that once created, these surpluses must be allocated to
something. Whether these policies are the result of Western political pressure or selfinterested choices aimed at disincentivizing the development of hydrocarbon alternatives is
best left for analysis elsewhere. Today, given high production rates, efficiency concerns
mandate that states' returns on extractive revenues at least equal the projected capital gains
on oil reserves minus the net of marginal extraction costs. See Frederick Van der Ploeg,
Why Do Many Resource-Rich Countries Have Negative Genuine Saving? Anticipation of
Better Times or Rapacious Rent Seeking, at 5-7 (Centre for Economic Policy Research
Discussion Paper No. DP7021, Oct. 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/paper 1311145.
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tion of the "statehood" of Kuwait, both internationally and domestically, might have been called into question, increasing the likelihood
64
of foreign invasion or a democratic revolution.
Second, while the al Sabah could have separated the public
and private spheres by transferring natural resource wealth to their
subjects, it would not have been acceptable to the individuals within
the royal family to transfer "their" oil wealth to the public at large. It
would essentially have converted a royally-controlled and monopolized resource (oil) into a resource freely distributable among the nation (cash). This likely would have shifted the domestic balance of
power in Kuwait and Abu Dhabi toward the merchant class, which
would have benefited dramatically from the increased demand for
tradable goods. Thus, the only option that protected both the international security and domestic power of the royal family was to dedicate oil revenues to the public sector.
There was, however, a secondary decision to be made on the
ratio of public spending to public savings. It was immediately clear
in Kuwait that very high savings rates were not likely to be accepted
by opposition groups; at least some portion of oil revenues was needed to buy off the merchant class. High public spending levels could
have potentially increased buy-in to the national identity and loyalty
to the al Sabah family if expansive government institutions were created to provide civil service positions, welfare payments and subsidized services to citizens. Indeed, in Kuwait and other Gulf states,
large bureaucracies were created;6 5 however, as soon as public funds
are spent, even through "loyalty-building" civil service structures and
64. In light of recent events in North Africa, the salience of this point is even more
apparent. The Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions have prompted Swiss authorities to freeze
the Swiss personal bank accounts of Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak,
respectively, over concerns about corruption. Adam Levine, Muharak Assets Frozen by
Swiss Government, CNN (Feb. 11, 2011), http://money.cnn.com/2011/02/11 news/
international/swiss banks mubarak/index.htm; Switzerland Freezes Assets of Zine AlAbidine Ben Ali and Laurent Gbagbo, GUARDIAN (Jan. 19, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk
/world/2011/jan/19/switzerland-freezes-assets-ben-ali-gbagbo.
By concentrating wealth in
personal accounts, these former leaders compromised internal legitimacy (illustrated by the
widespread domestic belief that their regimes were corrupt) and made the funds they had
amassed dependent on continued control of the state. Although no situation has presented
itself to test the resilience of elite control of SWFs in the context of regime change, it stands
to reason that the formalities of corporate governance would provide at least some temporary

buffer against asset seizure.
65. Kuwait Country Report, BERTELSMANN TRANSFORMATION INDEX 2010, http://www.
bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/ 1397.0.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2011) ("The state
bureaucracy is functional, but bloated; many positions were created to provide employment

for Kuwaiti citizens.").
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subsidies, royal control dissipates. Further, oil reserves are not unlimited, so public spending is not a sustainable model for ensuring
the continuous provision of "loyalty-building" services and subsidies.
In contrast, public savings are still controlled by the state,
which is dominated by the royal family and its agents. Therefore, the
royal influence and control created by public ownership of oil is preserved when oil revenues are allocated to a SWF. The KIA essentially transforms a natural resource monopoly into an "effective monopoly on capital. ' 66 When Kuwait's oil reserves eventually stop
producing, the al Sabah will still have control over the most important wealth-generating asset in the country. This will leave the
royal family financially autonomous; it will not have to rely on the
merchant class or the general public for taxes, ensuring that these
groups do not gain political leverage. It will also ensure that the general public remains mostly dependent on the state for income. Given
investment income from the SWF, it will remain possible to continue
paying citizens high wages to work for a few hours a day in the civil
service and making direct cash subsidies. Thus, the decision to create a SWF is consistent with the royal interest in protecting its position of financial and political privilege (i.e., its domestic autonomy).
In choosing to create a SWF rather than simply sitting on a
horde of dollars, Kuwait also satisfied Western powers that were
concerned about their balance of payments. As early as the 1950s,
the KIB played a significant role in the Eurodollar market, 67 and investments by the KIB, KIO and KIA have been critical to managing
the balance of payments between Kuwait and the West. 68 Investing
dollars abroad is fundamentally opposed to a mercantilist agenda 69
66. To be sure, public spending does shift some wealth to the private sector, but the
sheer size of the KIA's reserves and the strategic positions it holds in domestic financial
institutions tend to ensure that it will remain the dominant player in the Kuwaiti economy

(after the Kuwait Oil Company, of course). Further, unlike other institutional investment
managers, SWFs like the KIA are not subject to the threat of asset withdrawal; therefore, the
KIA is not as sensitive to demands for market returns. This enables the KIA to invest in
projects with below-market financial returns (which are addressed below), providing cheap
capital to political allies domestically and abroad.
67.

See JEAN FRANCOIS SEZNEC, THE FINANCIAL MARKETS OF THE ARABIAN GULF 61

(1987).
68. See Provisional Balance f Payments Statistics qf the State of Kuwait i)r Year
2005, CENTRAL BANK OF KUWAIT, http://www.cbk.gov.kw/cbkweb/servlet/cbkNewsMain?
Action=newsdisp&id=1022 (last visited Oct. 14, 2011) (see especially the line item
"Financial Account" in the table).
69. Reinvesting dollars abroad exchanges capital reserves for legal rights governed by
foreign law and thus runs counter to the mercantilist goal of accumulating capital assets. See

MUN supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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but is quite consistent with an autonomy-seeking goal. Without a
sovereign wealth fund to invest in oil surpluses outside Kuwait, there
likely would have been a severe backlash by the West against both
Kuwait's independence and its nationalization of the oil sector.
The transformation of the KIB to the KIO, then to the FGF
and eventually to the KIA also increased the autonomy of the al Sabah. Regarding the transition between the KIB and KIO, it is clear
that replacing the British-controlled KIB with the Kuwaiti-controlled
KIO was essential to increasing Kuwait's autonomy. After gaining
independence, seeking to control all of Kuwait's accumulated surplus
capital (rather than leaving it in a pseudo-trust administered by the
British) was only natural. The FGF was established in 1976 when
the Kuwait Oil Company was nationalized; 70 thus, dramatically increased revenues were expected to pour into the state coffers. By
forming the FGF, the al Sabah deflected the inevitable pressure to increase public spending by dedicating half of all accumulated assets
and ten percent of all future oil revenues to the sovereign wealth
fund. This protected royal autonomy on public spending decisions.
It also legitimized the decision to allocate oil revenues to the public
sector by justifying the fund as being created to benefit future generations of Kuwaiti citizens, rather than simply "Kuwait."
The FGF was, however, mostly focused on investments outside of Kuwait. When the 1982 Souk al Manakh stock market crash
threatened the survival of almost every large company in Kuwait, the
government stepped in to purchase shares in the traded companies
from the public, 71 and a new entity was needed to manage these
companies. Thus, the KIA was born. While the KIA has since partially privatized or reduced its holdings in these companies, 72 it is
clear that it was formed to facilitate the transfer of funds that had
been dedicated to international investments to a program designed to
prop up the domestic economy (and stabilize the resulting political
unrest). Housing both international and domestic investment management functions within the KIA ensured that potential future domestic crises could be averted more quietly. Interestingly, the legislation that created the KIA in 1982 prohibits the disclosure of any

70. Background Note: Kuwait, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE: BUREAU OF NEAR E. AFF. (Mar.
17, 2011), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35876.htm ("In 1976, the Kuwaiti Government
nationalized KOC.").
71.

John F. Wilson & Alexei P. Kireyev, The Knvaiti FinancialSystem: Structure and

Experience, in

KUWAIT:

FROM

GENERATIONS, supra note 61, at 29.
72.

Id.

RECONSTRUCTION

TO

ACCUMULATION

FOR FUTURE
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information about the organization or its performance to the publicat the penalty of up to three years in prison 73-cementing the autonomy of the al Sabah to direct the KIA as they please.
From the board of directors to its funding mechanisms, the institutional structure of the KIA functions to protect royal autonomy.
The KIA is led by Managing Director Bader Mohammad al Sa'ad,
Executive Director of Operations and Administration Othman al Essa
and Bader al Ajeel, Executive Director of General Reserves. 74 It is
overseen by a board of directors that is chaired by Mustafa Jassem al
Shimali and also includes Sheikh Salem Abdulaziz al Sabah, Bader
Mohammad al Sa'ad, Khalid al Rowaieh and Khalifa Musaad Hamada. 75 Board membership is allocated on an ex officio basis to the
Governor of the Central Bank, the Minister of Finance (who holds
the Chairmanship), the undersecretary of the Ministry of Finance and
customarily to the Minister of Oil. Additional seats are filled by
prominent Kuwaitis with experience in investment management, at
least three of whom must not concurrently hold a government position. The majority of the KIA's directors must be from the private
sector.

76

Thus, the KIA board of directors lacks the prominent royal
membership that characterizes SWFs in Abu Dhabi. However, this
does not necessarily indicate any large degree of independence from
the royal family. The Governor of the Central Bank, Minister of Finance, Minister of Oil and Undersecretary of the Ministry of Finance
are all appointed by the Emir and the Prime Minister (who is generally also the Crown Prince). Even the requirement for a "majorityprivate sector" board is tempered by the appointment process, which
the al Sabahs control; appointment of Board Members is executed
through an Emiri decree. 77

73.

Kuwait Law No. 47 of 1982.

74. Executive Management, KUWAIT INV. AUTH., http://www.kia.gov.kw/En/AboutKIA/OrganizationalStructure/OrgStrEM/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
75. Board of Directors, KUWAIT INV. AUTH., http://www.kia.gov.kw/En/AboutKIA
/OrganizationalStructure/Org-Str BOD/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 20, 2012);
Executive Management, KUWAIT INV. AUTH., http://www.kia.gov.kw/En/AboutKIA/
OrganizationalStructure/OrgStrEM/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 20, 2012); Kuvait
Investment Authority:
Board Members, BLOOMBERG Bus. WEEK, http://investing
.businessweek.com/businessweek/research/stocks/private/board.asp?privcapld=21922514
(last visited Nov. 21, 2011).
76. Governance at KIA, KUWAIT INV. AUTH., http://www.kia.gov.kw/En/AboutKIA/
Governance/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
77.

Board olDirectors,supra note 75.

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[50:1

Thus, despite a thin veneer of independence provided by the
presence of non-royal directors, the fact that directors are appointed
by the Emir and Prime Minister indicates that, in Western parlance,
the true shareholder in the KIA is the al Sabah family. 78 Further,
since there is no need to engage in any kind of proxy fight or to even
call a general shareholder meeting to effect the will of this shareholder, the directors can be fired at any time. Similarly, there is no "for
cause" restriction on termination in the organizing documents of the
KIA. 79 Thus, the Emir maintains unqualified and instantaneous control over the KIA and the power to direct KIA investment choices if
necessary.
In Kuwait, funding to the KIA is statutorily decreed. The
GRF was created in 1960 with funding to be drawn from budget surpluses.80 Article 2 of Law 106 of 1976 dedicated fifty percent of the
GRF as seed capital to the FGF. Article 1 additionally permanently
allocated ten percent of Kuwait's annual general revenues to the FGF
and prohibited any reduction of this percentage or withdrawal of
funds from the account. 81 This may seem to reduce royal control
over funding; however, given that the Emir retains a veto over all
new legislation, he has the power to propose legislation himself and
can dissolve the Assembly, the future of Law 106 of 1976 effectively
rests in the hands of the Emir (and thus the al Sabah family). Further,
the Emir may promulgate a royal decree pursuant to the law without
Assembly approval. Here, regulatory decrees are rather important, as
the ban on "withdrawal of funds" has been narrowly interpreted in
the past.
78.

Even if one were to deem the KIA a subsidiary of the state, the fact that the royal

family appoints the KIA directors and has a monopoly on executive power as a matter of

right (rather than through an election by the public at large) indicates that the "directors" (the
al Sabahs) of the "parent company" (Kuwait) cannot be replaced.

See id.

Thus, the

shareholders whose interests are represented in the KIA are simply the al Sabahs.
79. Note that whereas it is theoretically possible under the corporate law of
Delaware-the leading place of incorporation for U.S. firms-to fire directors, see DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2011), it is in practice rather difficult due to the widely diffused
ownership base of most public corporations, the associated collective action problems and
the array of defenses available to the Board, including staggered boards. For a recent
empirical analysis of the effects of these devices on shareholder wealth, see generally Lucian
A. Bebchuck, et al., Staggered Boards and the Wealth of Shareholders: EvidencejIom Two
Natural Experiments, in HARVARD LAW AND ECONOMICS DISCUSSION PAPER No. 697, 2010,
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id 1706806.
80. Robert Bacon & Silvana Tordo, Experiences with Oil Funds: Institutional and
FinancialAspects, Report 321106, ENERGY SECTOR MGMT. ASSIST. PROGRAM (June 2006),

http://www.earthrights.net/docs/World BankResourceRentFunds.pdf.
81.

Kuwait Law No. 106 of 1976.
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This brings up one of the clearest examples of the KIA acting
to maximize autonomy: the drawdown on FGF funds that occurred
during the Persian Gulf War. At the time of the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait, Kuwait's Assembly had been dissolved for four years-so it
could not possibly have approved any withdrawals from the FGF during the war. However, accumulated savings from the FGF were used
to provide short-term financing required by the heavy strain placed
on the economy by the Gulf War.82 The al Sabah additionally paid
millions to American public relations firms to drum up support for a
U.S.-led invasion of Kuwait to expel Iraq's army. 83 Additionally, after the allied coalition defeated the Iraqi forces and reinstalled the al
Sabah family, the FGF was used to fund reconstruction efforts and
provide direct subsidies to Kuwaiti citizens. 84 Granted, an invasion is
an extraordinary circumstance, but Sheikh Jaber's actions in utilizing
FGF funds were contrary to the express restrictions in Article 1 of
Law 106 of 1976 because the Assembly did not approve them. Furthermore, none of these actions were consistent with the KIA's professed mission of "achiev[ing] long term investment returns on the
financial reserves of the State of Kuwait. '85 They were, however,
consistent with autonomy-maximization.
Using FGF funds to continue payments to the civil service
was a remarkably astute way to ensure the loyalty of the bureaucracy
during the exile. Absent these payments, support for the al Sabah regime could easily have waned in favor of establishing a more powerful legislature since tensions had been running high prior to the invasion. Similarly, buying up the debt of Kuwaiti citizens (and
eventually forgiving most of it) ensured that citizens would not lose
their homes due to non-payment of their obligations. While an argument could be made that using FGF funds to pay for the reconstruction of Kuwait's oil infrastructure was consistent with achieving
long-term investment returns (because oil production is Kuwait's
most profitable investment 86), given the availability of extensive in82.

Bacon & Tordo, supra note 80, at 118.

83.

See JOHN STAUBER & SHELDON RAMPTON, Toxic SLUDGE IS GOOD FOR You: LIES,

DAMN LIES, AND THE PUBLIC RELATIONS INDUSTRY § 10 (2002).
84.

FED. RESEARCH DIV., KUWAIT: A COUNTRY STUDY 122 (1993).

85. Mission and Principles, KUWAIT INVESTMENT AUTHORITY 6-7, http://www.kia.
gov.kw/En/AboutKIA/MissionPrinciples/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 29, 2011).

86. However, oil is not its biggest revenue producer: by the mid-1980s, the KIA's
foreign investments had already surpassed oil exports as Kuwait's primary source of
revenues. Kuvait, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, available at http://www.britannica.com/

EBchecked/topic/325644/Kuwait/45147/Economy ("This oil income and the investment
income it generated the latter surpassed direct sales of oil revenues by the 1980s gave
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ternational loans at the time, Kuwait probably could have borrowed
money at rates below the returns on its international portfolio.
Spending from the FGF, however, emphasized the competence (and
"generosity") of the al Sabahs, while borrowing from the international community would have been a signal of weakness to the Kuwaiti
population. As a consequence of using FGF funds, the legitimacy of
the al Sabahs was protected, thereby securing their domestic autonomy in the long term.
Domestically, the KIA invests in a manner that effectively
buys out the political ambitions of the merchant class. The KIA has a
history of investing in the businesses of prominent merchant families
within Kuwait. While this kind of investment would not normally reflect a non-financial motive, it does suggest autonomy-maximization
in the Kuwaiti context. As discussed earlier, the merchant class is a
potential rival for political power in Kuwait. As early as 1950,
Sheikh Abdullah al Sabah "bought out" the political ambitions of the
merchant class by granting preferential monopolies, dealerships, extending personal loans and withdrawing the al Sabah family from
Kuwaiti commercial activity. 87 The continued allocation of oil revenues to the merchant class through KIA's domestic investment reflects the ongoing arrangement between the al Sabahs and Kuwait's
merchants: KIA funds are invested, few demands are made for dividends (as long as the family remains pliant) and shares are rarely
sold. When this politicized domestic investment activity slowed during the 1980s as a result of depressed oil prices, Kuwait's merchants
re-entered the political scene. In 1989, prominent members of the
merchant class began meeting in secret with members of the dissolved Assembly-worrying the al Sabahs enough that the Emir established a replacement for the Assembly (though the crisis was ultimately rendered moot by the Iraqi invasion). 88 Therefore, it is clear
that KIA's domestic investment strategy increases the autonomy of
the al Sabah family by preventing the emergence of serious challengers to royal legitimacy.
In the international arena, the KIA has generally followed a
conservative strategy by investing in a diversified portfolio while remaining below reporting requirements in most of its investments. To
be sure, most of its international investments are profit-driven. This
Kuwait one of the highest per capita incomes in the world.").
87.

JILL CRYSTAL,

OIL AND POLITICS IN THE GULF:

RULERS AND MERCHANTS IN

KUWAIT AND QATAR 75 77 (1995).
88. FED. RESEARCH DIV., KUWAIT: A COUNTRY STUDY 106 (2004), available at
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/kwtoc.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).

20111

MAXIMIZING AUTONOMY

is not, however, inconsistent with autonomy-maximization, as building wealth increases the range of policy options available to the al
Sabah family and preserves their ability to continue making these
policy decisions after Kuwait's oil reserves are eventually depleted.
On the subject of investment levels themselves, prior to its
Citigroup investment, the KIA held stakes larger than 5% in only
three publicly traded Western corporations: approximately a 24%
stake in Swiss hotelier Victoria Jungfrau Collection AG and approximately an 8% stake in GEA AG, 89 as well as a 5.3% share in Daim-

ler AG. 90 Remaining below the reporting threshold defined in domestic securities legislation is quite consistent with autonomymaximization, as it allows SWFs to avoid public scrutiny. 91 First, the
KIA is well aware of the political firestorm that could result if its international investments were publicized. When British Petroleum's
IPO floundered in 1987, the KIA purchased a substantial stake in the
company, acquiring 21.6% by March 1988, only to be ordered by the
British Monopolies and Mergers Commission to divest down to
9.9%.92 The British government also pressured the KIA to sell off
even more, which it did, leaving the KIA with the estimated 1.75% of

BP that it still holds today. 93 Second, crossing key investment
thresholds subjects even SWFs to an increased regulatory burden in
Western countries. By remaining below these thresholds, the KIA
ensures that the additional duties that these regimes impose do not restrain its investment. Finally, keeping investment levels below these
reporting thresholds ensures that the CFIUS will not review the

89. See Kuwait Investment Authority, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND NEWS, http://www.
sovereignwealthfundsnews.com/kuwaitinvestmentauthority.php (last visited Oct. 12, 2011).
90. Extraordinary Report, DAIMLER AG (Apr. 30, 2010), http://www.daimler.com/
Projects/c2c/channel/documents/1840573_ExtraordRepRenaultNissan_100430.pdf.
91. The reporting threshold varies from country to country. in the United States, for
example, it is five percent. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(g)(1), 15 U.S.C. §
78m(g)(1) (2006). In Switzerland, however, the reporting threshold is three percent. See
BUNDESGESETZ VOM 24 MARz 1995 UBER DIE BORSEN UND DEN EFFEKTENHANDEL [BEHG]

[Swiss Federal Act on Stock Exchanges and Securities Trading of Mar. 24, 1995], SR 954.1,
art. 31, available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/dsr/c954_ 1.htnl, translatedin http://www.sixexchange-regulation.com/download/admission/regulation/federal-acts/sesta-en.pdf.
92. Eric V. Thompson, A Brief'History of Major Oil Companies in the Gulf Region,
UNIV. OF VA. PETROLEUM ARCHIVES PROJECT, http://www.virginia.edu/igpr/APAG/apagoil
history.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
93. Anna Shiryaevskaya & Ayesha Daya, Kuwait Raising Stake in BP Depends"on
Market Conditions, Oil Minister Says, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Aug. 3, 2010), http://www.bloom
berg.con/news/2010-08-03/kuwait-raising-stake-in-bp-depends-on-market-conditions-oilminister-says.html.
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KIA's investments, as only "control" transactions are subject to review. 94 Therefore, by avoiding large investments and activist interventions in the management of companies, the KIA preserves its ability to invest in a wider array of businesses while avoiding regulatory
scrutiny and protectionist counter-measures-thereby maximizing its
autonomy in financial markets.
The KIA's extraordinary investments in Western financial institutions during December 2007 and January 2008 also reflect autonomy-maximizing behavior. While Bear Steams and Lehman
Brothers had not yet collapsed, it was fairly clear that subprime
mortgages posed a substantial risk to Western financial institutions.
In that environment, the KIA purchased three billion dollars 95 in
Citigroup convertible preferred shares bearing 7% interest and convertible at a 20% premium to the then-current share price. 96 At the
time, the federal overnight rate was about 4.25%, 97 so the preferred
shares presumably would yield a 2.75% premium; however, as preferred shares, the securities were not principal protected. It is hard to
understand why the KIA would have put such a large sum at risk
when the decline in Citigroup's share price showed no signs of slowing and had already reduced the company's valuation by 37% in the
last six months, with no end in sight. Simply put, something else
must have been going on.98

94. Ivan A. Schlager & Warren G. Lavey, Treasury Department Issues Final
Regulations Rebrming U.S. National Security Reviews ofForeign Investments, SKADDEN,
ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP & AFFILIATES 1 3 (Nov. 21, 2008), http://www.
skadden.com/content/Publications/Publications 1567-0.pdf.
95. Souhail Karam & Ulf Laessing, Kuwait Steps in To Sure Up [sic] Citigroup and
Merrill, ARABIAN BUSINESS (Jan. 16, 2008), available at http://www.arabianbusiness.com/
property/article/508312-kuwait-step-in-to-sure-up-citigroup-and-merrill.
96. See Peter Thal Larsen, Sovereign Funds Win Beneficial Deal Terms, FIN. TIMES
(Jan. 15, 2008), available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6cd48d84-c3a6-1ldc-bO830000779fd2ac.html#axzz I YnHrpIcO.
97. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve (Jan. 22, 2008), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20080122b.htm.
98. While the KIA was eventually able to sell its preferred shares for $4.1 billion,
yielding a profit of 36.7%, Kuwaiti Sovereign Wealth Fund Sells Stake in Citigroup for
$1. ]bn Profit, IRISH TIMES, Dec. 7, 2009, at 18, available at http://www.irishtimes.com/news
paper/finance/2009/1207/1224260241159.html, that deal seems to have been politicized and
there was no way to predict when the KIA initially purchased the preferred shares that
Citigroup would adjust the conversion price on the preferred shares down to $3.25 per share,
see Press Release, Citigroup, Inc., Citi to Exchange Preferred Securities for Common,
Increasing Tangible Common Equity to as Much as $81 Billion (Feb. 27, 2009), available at
http://www.citigroup.com/citi/press/2009/090227a.htm, to induce an early conversion under
a plan to increase tangible common equity. It was only this adjustment that enabled the KIA
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The KIA's investment into Merrill Lynch was on similar
terms: two billion dollars for convertible preferred shares bearing
nine percent interest, although these had a mandatory conversion feature after 2.75 years. 99 Similarly to the Citigroup investment, this
was a large risk to undertake given the uncertainty surrounding the
magnitude of exposure to mortgage-backed securities and the valuation of those securities. Although the conversion price was not initially disclosed, given that Merrill Lynch was trading at fifty-four
dollars per share at the time, and based on comparisons with the publicly disclosed investment in similar securities by the New Jersey Investment Council, the KIA's preferred shares were probably supposed to convert to two percent of Merrill's common stock. Again,
these shares were not principal protected, so the large risk taken by
the KIA does not make much intuitive sense.1 00 Either the KIA was
irrational, or there was something else going on in the transaction.
The investments into Citigroup and Merrill Lynch involved
the KIA taking on substantial downside risks to stabilize two Western
financial institutions in return for less-than-certain returns. By making these investments so quickly in a troubled market, the KIA imto profit from the deal. If the preferred shares had been either held or converted at the
original conversion price, the transaction would have resulted in substantial losses to the
KIA.
99. Tom Bawden, Citigroup is Staring at a Further Writedown of £3bn, Analyst Says,
TIMES
(London)
(Jan.
16,
2008),
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/
industry-sectors/banking-and finance/article3193312.ece.
100. Eventually, when Merrill Lynch ("Merrill") sought to induce the conversion of
these shares, the conversion price was dropped to $27.68 per share (and potentially even
lower if the New Jersey Investment Council's ("NJIC") complaint against Merrill was valid
and the KIA was the undisclosed "other investment group" that received a better conversion
price than the NJIC). See New Jersey Sues Merrill Lynch, Claims Deception, CONSUMER
AFFAIRS (July 29, 2009), http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2009/07/nj merrill
_lynch.html. The KIA's common shares in Merrill were eventually exchanged for 0.8595
shares in Bank of America ("BoA") during the Merrill-BoA merger. See Update 1: Kuwait
to
Keep
Merrill, Citi Stakes
for
Now,
REUTERS
(Sept.
6,
2009),

http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKL672397020090906?sp=true.
Assuming that the initial
conversion into Merrill common stock was at $27.68, this would have given the KIA about
72.25 million shares in Merrill, and 62.1 million shares in Bank of America. At the March
15, 2010 price of $16.75 per share, this means that the KIA's initial principal investment of
$2 billion has declined in value to about $1 billion-even after the adjusted conversion price
on Merrill. Adding in an assumed six quarters of interest payments on the preferred shares,
the KIA would have earned another $275 million, but the overall result of this investment
was rather disastrous. Interestingly, adding together the KIA's loss on this transaction and
its gain on the Citigroup transactions results in a net gain of $416.2 million equivalent to

an annualized 4.1% return, which is roughly equal to the targeted Federal Funds Overnight
Rate of 4.25% when these investments were originally made.
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proved Kuwait's reputation as a trustworthy and responsible player in
the global financial system. This reputational boost should improve
the KIA's autonomy relative to Western financial regulators in the
future, as the KIA should be seen as less threatening. It also can be
viewed as part of the security bargain between the United States and
Kuwait. In the two years following these investments, U.S. firms
have announced weapons sales and military base construction projects in Kuwait valued at over $1.9 billion.'10 The security guarantee
provided by the United States is not unique. The al Sabahs secured
Ottoman support by sending tributary payments, 10 2 and British protection from the 1930s through the 1960s was secured by the provision of access to Kuwaiti oil fields.10 3 In either case, the result of the
KIA's investments in Western financial firms during the crisis was an
increase in autonomy.
The KIA was also deeply involved in bailing out the domestic
Kuwaiti financial and industrial sectors. Law Decree No. 2 of 2009,
entitled "Enhancing the State Economic Security," authorized the
KIA to recapitalize domestic banks through convertible bonds, shares
or sukuk bonds, 10 4 and extend subordinated loans to, or purchase
convertible bonds, sukuks or preferred shares in, domestic businesses
in the productive sector. 10 5 It also authorized the Central Bank of
Kuwait to guarantee domestic banks' investment portfolios and real
estate debt obligations, 0 6 and to guarantee up to fifty percent of
new 107 or refinanced' 08 commercial loans made to domestic business101. See Up in Arms, CNNMONEY, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/
storysupplement/up in arms/ (showing $854 million in sales agreements from the US to
Kuwait for 2008-2009) (last visited Nov. 21, 2011); Arms Transfers Database,STOCKHOLM
INT'L PEACE RESEARCH INST., http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page /trade register.php
(select "USA" as the supplier and "Kuwait" as the recipient and the year range of 20082009, and then click on the "download" icon) (showing an additional $1.1 billion agreement
for the sale of three KC 130J Hercules tanker/transport planes in 2009) (last visited Nov. 21,
2011).
102.

See BIDWELL supra note 55 at 8.

103. See Richard A. Mobley, Gaugingthe Iraqi Threat to Kuwait in the 1960s, 45 STUD.
IN
INTELLIGENCE
19,
20-21
(2011),
available at
http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA529668.
104. Kuwait Law Decree No. 2 of 2009 on Enhancing the State Economic Stability, art.
6 (2009), translation available at http://www.bakertillykuwait.com/PDF/Law-Decree-No-2of-2009-Eng.pdf.
105.

Id. art. 12.

106.

Id. art. 3.

107.

Id. art. 8.

108.

Id. art. 12.
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es in the productive sector.
Pursuant to this law, the KIA intervened dramatically in the
domestic private sector. In April of 2009, the KIA made a $1.4 billion investment into companies traded on the Kuwait Stock Exchange
("KSE") to fight off a regional stock market rout. 10 9 This is not an
investment that a profit-maximizing fund would make-higher profits could be made by investing after a large run on the market than by
stabilizing it-nor would a mercantilist institution make the investment, as it puts precious capital at risk. Similarly, investing domestically does not serve imperialist motives.
The investment was, however, a strong move toward protecting the autonomy of the ruling elite. During the previous bull market
on the KSE, Kuwaiti citizens invested heavily into KSE-traded companies. If their investments had collapsed, political turmoil might
have followed, especially since the KIA had already acted to stabilize
Western financial institutions. By stabilizing the KSE, the KIA rescued panicked small investors and stabilized the value of large merchant-controlled companies, thereby preventing the spread of political unrest and ensuring the continued autonomy of the ruling elite.
The level of private financing provided under Law Decree No. 2 of
2009 is unknown, but it is almost certain that the KIA purchased
convertible bonds and sukuks on terms favorable to equity holders.
These mechanisms provided another protection against political unrest-this time by pacifying the owners of privately held companies
(which are generally members of prominent merchant families or
tribal leaders). There were even rumors that KIA bailout funds were
being selectively directed to the companies owned by the al Sabahs'
political allies-a charge that the KIA denied, 110 but the truth of
which would be consistent with previous KIA investment behavior.
In summary, the formation of the KIA and its predecessor
SWFs in Kuwait were autonomy-maximizing events aimed at ensuring international recognition of Kuwait's statehood and the al Sabah
family as its legitimate rulers. In light of the geopolitical context in
which Kuwait finds itself, the general strategy of investing internationally for profit in a mostly passive fashion furthers the same goal.
By quietly recycling foreign exchange earnings from oil exports
through the KIA, Kuwait essentially cements the implicit security
109.

Kuwait's KIA pumps $1.4bn in Bourse Fund, TRADE ARABIA (Apr. 27, 2009),

http://www.tradearabia.com/news/CM_160338.html.
110. Jamal Yali, Finance Minister Denies Giving Halt to KIA Studies Presented by
Companies, KUWAIT NEWS AGENCY (July 6, 2009), http://www.kuna.net.kw/News
AgenciesPublicSite/ArticleDetails.aspx?id 2012434&Language en.
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bargain it has with the United States. Additionally, several extraordinary events support our argument that the KIA serves primarily autonomy-maximizing goals. First, the drawdown on KIA assets during the Persian Gulf War demonstrates that Kuwait's elite have used
KIA accounts as a backup source of funds to prevent any disruption
in payments to important allies (both domestic and international) on
whom they rely for security and legitimacy-one that remains viable
even if access to oil revenues has been compromised. Second, politicized domestic investments demonstrate how KIA investments have
been used to pay off potential challengers to the ruling elite. Furthermore, the KIA's large investments into Citigroup and Merrill
Lynch during the financial crisis illustrate how SWF assets are used
to meet Kuwait's political obligations during times of international
turmoil. Lastly, the bailout of the Kuwaiti economy in the aftermath
of the 2008 crisis reinforces this theme: the KIA is used to deflect
calls for political autonomy, revealing autonomy-maximizing motives.
B. Abu Dhabi
Much of the story in Abu Dhabi mirrors that in Kuwait. The
creation of ADIA and other Abu Dhabi SWFs, their general investment strategy and their extraordinary actions all reflect autonomymaximizing behavior. It is useful, however, to delve into the particulars. First, Abu Dhabi's SWFs exist at a sub-national level, which
presents an interesting story of domestic autonomy-maximization
relative to other ruling Emirati families. Second, the evolution of
SWFs in Abu Dhabi is peculiarly linked to issues of succession and
royal power sharing. Finally, the "grand bargain" with the merchant
class is especially obvious in the context of the domestic banking
sector.
In Abu Dhabi, four distinct sovereign wealth funds coexist,
the oldest of which, ADIA, dates back to 1976 and the newest of
which, Mubadala, was created in 2002. The same general argument
applies to the creation of SWFs to manage oil revenues in Abu Dhabi
as in Kuwait. Allocating revenues to a public-sector savings vehicle
transforms the royal family's monopoly on oil reserves into a virtual
monopoly on capital. Thus, the creation of a SWF maximizes royal
autonomy comparatively more than distributing revenues to the private sector, keeping revenues in private bank accounts or allocating
them more substantially toward public spending.
The creation of a SWF also maximizes autonomy relative to
Western powers. As mentioned in the Kuwait case study above,
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Western powers have been concerned about the balance of payments
resulting from oil sales since the Gulf States first assumed any degree
of control over the revenues. In Abu Dhabi in particular, the consequences of refusing to recycle currency to the West are vividly apparent. When the former Emir Sheikh Shakhbout bin Sultan ruled
over Abu Dhabi, he pursued an aggressively mercantilist strategy:
"he insisted on keeping his reserves in gold and on inspecting them in
the bank each week" and "hid himself on his yacht in Abu Dhabi
harbour, where he kept his sheep and his gold bars."'111 In 1966, development spending was only £1.75 million out of over £200 million
in revenues,1 12 creating a large imbalance in international payments.
Consequently, he was deposed by his brother Zayed, who relied on
British backing and the support of credibly neutral members of the al
Nahyan family. Understandably, the subsequent rulers in Abu Dhabi
have been careful to maintain their implicit obligations to recycle
currency to the West in order to prevent Western interventions in the
domestic political realm-thereby protecting the al Nahyan family's
domestic autonomy.
Another prominent attribute of the SWFs in Abu Dhabi is that
they are controlled at the sub-national level. This can be explained as
a consequence of the circumstances surrounding the creation of the
U.A.E., but it also maximizes the autonomy of the al Nahyan family
within the national context. The formation of the U.A.E. was an ambitious political endeavor that was particularly precarious because it
sought to subordinate the previously sovereign powers of seven
emirates ruled by six families to a national superstructure. Given that
Abu Dhabi possessed the vast majority of oil reserves in the U.A.E.
but only a minority of the population, Sheikh Zayed al Nahyan would
have insisted on reserving control of oil deposits to the emirate in
which they were located.1 13 Indeed, Article 23 of the U.A.E. consti11.

HALLIDAY, supra note 4, at 464.

112. For development spending, see id. For total revenues, see 1966: Kuwmait,
AsTHEYSAWIT.CoM, http://astheysawit.com/9200-1966-kuwait.html (last visited Nov. 21,
2011) (listing 1965 1966 oil revenues at $605 million). The exchange rate for U.S. dollars
to pounds sterling in 1966 was I USD to 0.35714 GBP. Foreign Currency Units Per] U.S.
Dollar, 1948 2009, PACIFIC EXCHANGE RATE SERVICE, http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca/etc
/USDpages.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2011).
113. At one point, the Union aspired to encompass the entire Trucial Coast, including
Bahrain and Qatar. It was this very divide between wealth and population, along with
disagreements on the locus of authority over the incipient military, that drove Bahrain and
Qatar to drop out of the proposed union. See id. at 469-71. Following their withdrawal,
although Abu Dhabi's bargaining position in the negotiations to create the U.A.E. improved
relative to the smaller emirates because the availability of potential alternative funding
sources for the government declined significantly, the other sheikhs outnumbered the al
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tution provides that "the natural resources and wealth in each Emirate
shall be considered to be the public property of that Emirate."1' 14 The
inclusion of "wealth" in this constitutional provision indicates that retaining sub-national autonomy over the use of oil revenues was critically important to the political bargain that created the U.A.E. By reserving oil revenues to the individual emirates, the U.A.E.
Constitution ensured that SWFs would be owned, controlled and administered at the sub-national level. This in turn ensured that investment and spending decisions remained a local matter, thereby
maximizing the autonomy of Abu Dhabi (and thus the al Nahyan
family).
Other emirates, particularly Dubai, have tried to establish independent wealth-generating assets to increase their ability to resist
the influence of Abu Dhabi's oil revenues in the federal political system. While Dubai's rapid expansion has been impressive, particularly in its evolution into a global transshipment and distribution center,
its aggressive leveraging strategy put its progress in jeopardy when
the financial crisis hit. When it looked like Dubai's repayment obligations on a large sukuk issued by Nakheel could not be met, a
bailout from Abu Dhabi seemed likely-but was not assured. While
Abu Dhabi reversed from its initial position that it would not backstop Dubai's debt, the subtext was that Dubai's ambitions on influence within the federal system would be curtailed. Indeed, in January of 2010, the Burj Dubai-which was supposed to be a symbol of
Dubai's achievement-was renamed the Burj Khalifah, in honor of
Sheikh Khalifah bin Zayed al Nahyan of Abu Dhabi.' 15 The world's
tallest tower now stands in the middle of Dubai as a reminder that it
is Abu Dhabi, and thus the al Nahyan family, that has control and autonomy within the U.A.E. 116

Nahyans and could have co-opted Abu Dhabi's resources through the Executive Council of
the U.A.E. if ownership had not been reserved to the sub-national political units. Since it
would have been difficult for the smaller, poorer emirates to offer concessions to the al
Nahyans in exchange for truly national ownership of oil, it is little wonder that ownership
was reserved to the individual emirates.
114. Although the U.A.E. Constitution in force today was formally adopted in 1996, it
varies little from the "interim" Constitution drafted and adopted in 1971.
115. See Andy Sambidge & Andrew White, World's tallest tower hits 828m, renamed
Burj Khali/a, ARABIANBUSINESS.COM (Jan. 4, 2010), http://www.arabianbusiness.com
/world-s-tallest-tower-hits-828m-renaned-burj-khalifa-27406.htnl; World's tallest building
opens in Dubai, BBC NEWS (Jan. 4, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8439618.stm.
116. The bailout of Dubai's debt was funded by $10 billion in bond purchases by the
U.A.E. Central Bank (which is overwhelmingly funded by Abu Dhabi) and $10 billion in
bond purchases made directly by the government of Abu Dhabi; these transactions coincide
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Another unique feature in the history of SWFs in Abu Dhabi
is the proliferation of different funds. The creation of these new
funds could probably be explained in a number of ways, such as increasing efficiency through specialization, but it is probably best understood through the lens of royal succession.' 17 Between 1909 and
1928, a series of fratricides and early deaths plunged Abu Dhabi's
political system into chaos. It was only the intervention of the eldest
son of Sheikh Zayed the Great,' 18 Khalifah bin Zayed bin Sultan al
Nahyan (who had refused the position of Emir several times), that
created the stability necessary to install Shakbout bin Sultan bin
Zayed al Nahyan as Emir for thirty-eight years. Khalifah's sons, collectively known as the Bani Khalifa, were also critical in the coup
that deposed Shakbout in favor of his younger brother Zayed in 1966.
In light of this legacy of fratricide and instability, the proliferation of
SWFs in Abu Dhabi is best understood as the expansion of institutional space. By opening new spaces within a controlled area of the
economy in which non-ruling royals may pursue their ambitions, the
creation of new SWFs lowers the stakes in royal succession and creates a common interest among royals in preserving the status quothereby reducing the likelihood of intra-familial fractures and increasing the autonomy of the royal family.
After ADIA was established in 1976, Sheikh Zayed al Nahyan quickly created the Abu Dhabi Investment Company ("ADIC")
in 1977 to focus on domestic investments. The ADIC was initially
with a forecasted $23 billion deficit in Abu Dhabi's budget-which was in turn covered by
transfers from ADIA and ADICU to the general budget. Camilla Hall & Vivian Salama,
Abu Dhabi Forecasts $23 Billion Budget Deficit in 2010, Prospectus Shows, BLOOMBERG
NEWS (July 20, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-20/abu-dhabi-forecasts23-billion-budget-deficit-in-201 0-prospectus-shows.html.
117. The following paragraph is largely drawn from Davidson's account in Christopher
Davidson, Afier Sheikh Zayed: The Politics of Succession in Abu Dhabi and the U.A.E., 13
MIDDLE EAST POLICY 42, 42 59 (Spring 2006). It is also important to note that the merchant
class was not as influential in Abu Dhabi as in Kuwait. Abu Dhabi was not a natural
transshipment point for trade, see DONALD HAWLEY, THE TRUCIAL STATES 197 (1970), so
the 1920s collapse of the pearling market eroded merchant influence to a far greater extent in
Abu Dhabi than in Kuwait. Further, Abu Dhabi had been effectively demilitarized since the
late 1800s after Britain guaranteed its security, so merchant influence over the tribal levies
was not as important. See Emirates History British Era, GLOBALSECURITY, http://www.

globalsecurity.org/military/world/gulf/uae-history-british.htm (last updated Sept. 7, 2011).
118.

Sheikh Zayed the Great ruled from 1855 through 1909 and signed the treaty with

the British that recognized Abu Dhabi's sovereignty (and handed the conduct of its
international affairs over to Britain). A Walk Through Time: Zayed the Great, UAE
INTERACT, http://www.uaeinteract.com/history/e-walk/con_2/con2_1.asp
12,2011).

(last visited Oct.
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almost wholly owned by ADIA. Setting up the ADIC as a virtual
subsidiary reflects a distinct decision by Sheikh Zayed al Nahyan to
separate domestic and foreign investment decision-making. This decision expanded the political space available to accommodate allies
and potential rivals. By placing different factions of the royal family
on the board of directors at each SWF, the Emir could reward his allies and pacify potential rivals without allowing any individual to accumulate enough power to pose a serious political threat. For instance, directors and officers at the domestically-focused ADIC could
presumably gain considerable domestic influence in the merchant and
industrial communities but could not access the larger assets at the
parent-fund level. On the opposite side, ADIA directors and officers
control massive amounts of capital but do not interact with the local
business community on a daily basis. Therefore, separating domestic
and international investment functions decreased the likelihood of
conflicts within the royal family or political unrest from tribal allies.
Both objectives are consistent with autonomy-maximization.
In 1984, Sheikh Zayed established the International Petroleum Investment Company ("IPIC") as a fifty-fifty joint venture between ADIA and the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company ("ADNOC"),
giving it a mandate to focus on investments in the petrochemical sector. 119 The IPIC was essentially a forum in which ADNOC and
ADIA could arrive at a consensus on investments in the petroleum
sector after balancing financial returns against Abu Dhabi's strategic
needs related to oil.120 ADIA representatives on the IPIC board typically judged the financial merits of acquisitions, while ADNOC officials reviewed their strategic value to Abu Dhabi's oil sector. 121 Still,
the Supreme Petroleum Council retained the ultimate decisionmaking authority over IPIC investments 122 to ensure that they conformed to the IPIC's mandate of securing high-quality upstream services and downstream markets for Abu Dhabi's primary export. 123
The creation of the IPIC created additional institutional space within
the realm of SWFs, allowing Sheikh Zayed to accommodate the po119. Abu Dhabi The International Petroleum Investment Co., APS REVIEW
DOWNSTREAM TRENDS (Jan. 27, 2003), http:Hgoliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-2473603/
ABU-DHABI-The-International-Petroleum.html.
120. Without this cooperation, ADIA and ADNOC could have found themselves
pursuing contradictory petrochemical investment strategies or duplicating investments

resulting in overexposure.
121.

Abu DhabiTheInternationalPetroleum Investment Co., supra note 119.

122.

Id.

123. Abu Dhabi-Overseas Investments, APS REVIEW DOWNSTREAM TRENDS (Jan. 18,
1999), http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Abu+Dhabi+-+Overseas+lnvestments.-a053639875.
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litical ambitions of additional family members and political allies.
Initially, Sheikh Zayed delegated supervisory roles at the
SWFs, ADNOC, the diwan (Council of State) and many ministries to
his Bani Khalifa allies, thereby shoring up support against loyalists to
the deposed Sheikh Shakbout and increasing Sheikh Zayed's policymaking autonomy in other areas. As the senior members of the Bani
Khalifah grew older and his own sons came of age, Sheikh Zayed
shifted control of the SWFs and government agencies to his own sons
to satisfy their political ambitions and smooth the way for an eventual succession. Prior to his death, Sheikh Zayed had placed ADIA under the influence of a younger son, Ahmed (generally seen as being
allied with Khalifa bin Zayed and not a succession challenger), while
retaining the chairmanship for himself; IPIC was the province of
Mansour (another younger son), and ADIC was placed under the
control of key tribal allies. However, none of these appointees were
politically ambitious. Sheikh Zayed's eldest son, and then-Crown
Prince, Khalifa, was appointed to lead the Supreme Petroleum Council and Executive Council. Mohammed was given a leadership posi124
tion in the United Defense Forces, the U.A.E. military.
Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al Nahyan's death in 2004 prompted
the first succession in Abu Dhabi since independence. It also marked
the first uncontested transfer of power since the death of Zayed the
Great in 1909. Despite his position as Crown Prince, it was not certain that Khalifa would succeed to his father's position over Mohammed, because Mohammed's political status had grown tremendously due to his position as the eldest brother within the Bani
Fatima. 125 While Khalifa had secured the support of the Bani Khalifa, the tribal hinterland and most of his brothers outside the Bani
Fatima, Mohammed could have made the succession difficult. Consequently, upon his appointment as Emir, Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed
al Nahyan immediately enacted measures designed to reward his
supporters and mollify the Bani Fatima.
Khalifa first upheld the accession of Mohammed as Crown
124. For a discussion of the position of Sheikh Zayed's sons and tribal allies prior to his
death, along with the succession options then in play, see John Duke Anthony, Succession in
the Emirate of Abu Dhabi and the UAE: An Assessment qf the Players and the Likely
Possibilities, GULFWIRE
(2001), available at http://www.ncusar.org/publications/
Publications/] 999-08-30-Succession-In-Abu-Dhabi-and-The-UAE.pdf.
125. Fatima was Sheikh Zayed's favorite wife and the mother of six sons. CHRISTOPHER
M. DAVIDSON, ABU DHABI: OIL AND BEYOND 98, 99 (2009). In contrast, Khalifa's mother,
Sheika Hassa bint Mohammed bin Khalifa al Nahyan, bore only one son: Khalifa. Family
Feeling Behind the Football, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 27, 2008, at 64, available
at http://www.economist.com/node/12305389.
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Prince 126 and appointed him as Chairman of the Abu Dhabi municipal government. 127 He then decreed the creation of Mubadala (another SWF) in 2002,128 transferred ADIA's interest in IPIC to
ADNOC, spun off the Abu Dhabi Investment Council ("ADICU")
from ADIA and transferred ADIA's domestic assets (including
ADIC, the National Bank of Abu Dhabi ("NBAD") and the Abu
Dhabi Commercial Bank ("ADCB")) to the newly independent
ADICU.129 The historical, transitional and current institutional structure of Abu Dhabi's SWFs is shown in the Annex, Figure 1.
The dramatic 2004 reorganization not only decentralized control of Abu Dhabi's SWFs, but also divided control between powerful political players within the Emirate. Mubadala's very existence is
owed to Sheikh Mohammed's political influence. Without a fund of
his own, Mohammed would have been more likely to make a serious
challenge to the succession rather than to rally behind Khalifa. Similarly, Mansour gained increased control over IPIC after ADIA's
shares were transferred to ADNOC. Without the supervisory role
that ADIA-aligned directors had played in IPIC, Mansour would
have had greater freedom to pursue investments of his own choosing.
Operational control of the new ADICU has been effectively delegat130
ed to al Nahyan tribal allies (the al Kindi and al Suwaidi).
The consequences of separating the SWFs are not merely theoretical. ADICU expanded its original "domestic" mandate to be-

126.

(Nov.

Khalila Consolidates Alliances for the Post-ZayedEra, GULF STATES NEWSLETTER
12, 2004), http://www.gsn-online.com/HTML/Public/GSNsWorld/FreeContent/

Free content_63.html.
127.

Khalifa Names Mohammed Chairman of Exec. Council, KHALEEJ TIMES (Dec. 9,

2004), http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticle.asp?xfile

data/theuae/2004/December/

theuaeDecember208.xml&section=theuae.
128. The Mubadala Story, MUBADALA, http://mubadala.ae/about/history/ (last visited
Oct. 15, 2011).
129. Abu Dhabi Investment Council, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND INST., http://www.
swfinstitute.org/swfs/abu-dhabi-investment-council/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2011); Abu Dhabi
Investment Authority, TAIGHDE, http://taighde.com/w/AbuDhabi-InvestmentAuthority
(last visited Oct. 15, 2011); Investment Strategy, ABU DHABI INV. COUNCIL, http:/www.
adcouncil.ae/AboutUs/InvestmentStrategy/tabid/63 /Default.aspx (last visited Oct. 15, 2011)
(showing equity stakes in prominent Abu Dhabi businesses).
130. ADICU is ultimately supervised by a collection of royal family members who
serve on the board of directors, including Khalifa and his brothers Mohammed, Mansour,
Hamed and Sultan bin Tahnun of the Bani Khalifa. See Board of Directors,ABU DHABI INV.
COUNCIL, http://www.adcouncil.ae/AboutUs/BoardofDirectors/tabid/57/Default.aspx
(last
visited Oct. 15, 2011).
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come an international investment vehicle. 131 In buying up New
York's Chrysler building in 2008,132 ADICU seems to be treading in-

to territory traditionally covered by ADIA. Financially speaking,
there is little reason that ADICU should have been investing in New
York real estate. The Council's mandate was domestic, its employees have focused on domestic investing for some forty years and if
the investment opportunity was attractive, there is no reason that
ADIA would not be the appropriate vehicle. The absence of any response by ADICU's al Nahyan directors suggests that a distinct decision has been made to accept the actions of their tribal allies at the
helm of ADICU-at least as long as they remain pliant allies.
In a similar fashion, IPIC, moving far beyond its "petrochemical" mandate under Mansour's direction, acquired a 16.3% stake in
Barclays in 2008 through a deal that sidestepped the supervision of
Sheikh Khalifa and was probably brokered through Mansour's Dubai
connections. 133 The transaction was rather murky, as it was reported
that Mansour agreed to the deal in both a personal capacity and as the
chairman of the IPIC board. Although much publicity accompanied
IPIC's subsequent disinvestment in June 2009, IPIC retained a 5%
stake in Barclays. 134 Apparently, IPIC is still in the banking business. The decision to allow Mansour to push for these kinds of nonpetrochemical investments seems to be a conciliatory measure de135
signed to mitigate any friction with Khalifa.
The very creation of Mubadala seems to be designed to pacify
Mohammed bin Zayed by allowing him to pursue his own vision for
developing Abu Dhabi, which tends to be more aggressive and modernizing than that of Khalifa or their father Zayed. Thus, Mohammed's Mubadala has moved aggressively to take significant stakes in
high-profile foreign companies (e.g., Rolls-Royce, AMD Computing,
131. See History, ABU DHABI INV. COUNCIL, http://www.adcouncil.ae/AboutUs/
History/tabid/92/Default.aspx (last visited Oct. 15, 2011); see also supra page 137
(discussing the fact that ADICU was created from ADIA and capitalized with ADIA's

domestic assets

indicating its original domestic mandate).

132. Landon Thomas Jr., A Grow ing Trophy Case: Foreign Investors Acquire More
Pieces ofAmericana, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2008, at C1.

133.

Mansour is tied to Dubai through marriage, see HH Sheikha Manal Bint

Mohammed bin RashidAl Maktoum Will Be Honoredby CITYarts, AMEINFO (Apr. 27, 2009,

1:54 PM), http://www.ameinfo.com/194238.html.
134. Joanna Hartley, Abu Dhabi's IPIC Sells 11%
Stake in Barclays,
ARABIANBUSINESS.COM (June 2, 2009, 11:07 AM), http://www.arabianbusiness.com/abudhabi-s-ipic-sells- 11-stake-in-barclays- 17720.html.

135. The support of Mansour is key to diffusing any potential opposition to Khalifa
from the Bani Fatima bloc of the al Nahyan family.
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the Carlyle Group and Ferrari, among others). Mubadala also invests
domestically in numerous firms in various sectors, including health
services, aerospace and large-scale aluminum smelting. 136 Perhaps
most surprisingly, however, Mubadala has acquired large stakes in
some domestic petroleum services companies and has even bought
significant stakes in oil blocs around the world through its wholly
owned subsidiary, Liwa Energy. 137 It is clear that Mubadala's mandate is not geographically limited, nor is it limited by sector (as it has
moved into IPIC's traditional realm). There seems to be little financial rationale behind creating an entire new SWF rather than creating
a fund for aggressive investments under ADIA. Politically, however,
creating space for Mohammed to pursue his own aims was important
to ensuring an uncontested succession for Khalifa.
Overall, the proliferation of multiple SWFs in Abu Dhabi has
increased the institutional space available for members of the royal
family, increasing their individual autonomy and creating a more stable political environment in which dissent is less likely (thereby increasing Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed bin Sultan's autonomy as Emir in
a broader sense). This strategy was pursued by Sheikh Zayed bin
Sultan and was expanded during the succession that led to his son
Khalifah bin Zayed bin Sultan ascending to the position of Emir.
It is equally important to recognize that the al Nahyan family
retains control over the management of each SWF in Abu Dhabi. At
ADIA, the board of directors is composed of six royal family members and four close tribal allies. 138 As the largest of Abu Dhabi's
SWFs, it is considered the third most powerful institution in Abu
Dhabi. Accordingly, the Emir directly holds the position of Chairman and his younger brother Ahmed (who is not a political rival in
any sense) directly manages the operations of ADIA through his position as managing director. At ADICU, while the Executive Council
and management positions are dominated by tribal allies rather than
the al Nahyans, five of eight board seats are held by the al Nahyan
family, ensuring ultimate royal control.1 39 At IPIC, non-royals hold
the majority of board seats, but the fund is now a wholly owned subsidiary of ADNOC, thereby placing it under ultimate royal control.
136.

See Sectors, MUBADALA, http://mubadala.ae/sectors/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2011).

137. Energy: Assets, MUBADALA, http://mubadala.ae/sectors/energy/assets/ (last visited
Oct. 15, 2011).
138. Board of/Directors, ABU DHABI INV. AUTH., http://www.adia.ae/En/People/BoardOf Directors.aspx (last visited Oct. 1, 2010).
139. Id. See also Executive Committee, ABU DHABI INV. COUNCIL, http://wwW.ad
council.ae/AboutUs/ExecutiveCommittee/tabid/93/Default.aspx (last visited Jan. 6, 2011).
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In practice, IPIC is dominated by Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed al Nahyan, even though the managing director is not a member of the al
Nahyan family. Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan is the
chairman of the board at Mubadala; he has surrounded himself with
40
allies who have worked alongside him for decades and technocrats. 1
In all of these SWFs, the al Nahyan family controls the nomination
and removal processes for directors-ensuring that when push comes
to shove, these SWFs will serve the interests of the royal family and
thus ensure its autonomy from political competition at home and
abroad.
In addition to maintaining royal control over the SWFs'
boards of directors, the autonomy of the royal family is assured
through SWF funding mechanisms. For Abu Dhabi's SWFs, it is difficult to confirm exactly when and how funding decisions are made
with respect to state revenue stream allocation, as there is no controlling public law like that in Kuwait. It is, however, fairly certain that
the Supreme Petroleum Council (SPC) must clear all decisions on
changes in the allocation of oil revenues. Since the chair of the SPC
is the Emir, and al Nahyans and Emiri-appointed tribal allies hold the
other seats, it is apparent that funding remains a failsafe tool to ensure SWF loyalty to the royal family.
Beyond the creation and institutional structures of Abu Dhabi's SWFs, their investment decisions also reflect an autonomymaximizing objective. In the international sphere, ADIA's trademark
has been its tendency to purchase small stakes in companies below
the threshold for mandatory reporting requirements. ADIA's head of
strategy Jean-Paul Villain, a Frenchman who has held top positions at
ADIA for most of the past two decades, noted that keeping ADIA's
stake below this threshold eliminates the headaches associated with
being a named shareholder. 141 As noted in the Kuwait case study
above, this strategy is autonomy-maximizing because it maximizes
the number of investment opportunities that ADIA can pursue without triggering a political backlash. As in the case of the KIA, Abu
Dhabi's SWFs do not follow this "small investment" strategy inside
the Middle East (including inside Abu Dhabi itself) where political
140. See

CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIDSON, DUBAI:

THE VULNERABILITY OF SUCCESS

157

(2008).
141. Sudip Roy, Money and Mystery: ADIA Unveils Its Secrets, EUROMONEY, Apr.
2006, at 70-76 (Apr. 2006). While Villain also attributed this strategy to increases in market
efficiency that have made it more difficult and expensive to make big bets, he emphasized
that ADIA's secrecy (which would be impossible if investments were made above the
reporting threshold) is critical to reducing the risk of political objections to ADIA
investments.
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reactions are less likely. For instance, ADIA holds large shares in the
Arab Banking Corporation, the Arab International Bank, U.A.E.'s
Union Cement Company, Qatar Telecom and Egypt's EFG Hermes
Holding. 142 Similarly, ADIA does not nominate directors for Western companies but does nominate and elect directors onto the boards
of Middle Eastern companies. It is therefore apparent that ADIA's
general strategy is autonomy-maximizing.
ADIA's extraordinary investment in Citigroup can also best
be explained as autonomy-maximizing. First, the investment fits
with ADIA's aversion to exceeding reporting requirements: the convertible bonds convert to no more than 4.9% of Citigroup Inc.'s equi-

ty.143 It was not, however, secretive. This is in large part because the
investment was not made through the normal Villain-led strategysetting and opportunity-identifying regime. In this transaction, former Treasury Secretary and Citigroup's then-Chairman Robert Rubin
(whose political linkages to the American government were not unnoticed) traveled to Abu Dhabi and met and shook hands with Sheikh
Ahmed bin Zayed and Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed. Two days later, the money was wired to a Citigroup account. 144 This transaction's
departure from almost all of ADIA's traditional investing patterns
makes it look suspiciously like a political investment-one that is, in
fact, autonomy-maximizing. By supporting the recapitalization of
Citigroup, ADIA conveyed that it is a cooperative player within the
system of global economic governance, 145 which should open more
142.

MANDA

SHEMIRANI,

SOVEREIGN

WEALTH

FUNDS

AND

THE INTERNATIONAL

POLITICAL ECONOMY 79-80 (2011).

143. Eric Dash & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Fund in Abu Dhabi to Pay $7.5 Billion br
4.9% oBank, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2007, at C1.

144. Emily Thornton & Stanton Reed, Inside the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority,
(June 6, 2008), http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/jun2008/
gb2008065_742165.htm. Although Jean-Paul Villain indicated that the investment was in
line with existing strategy (because ADIA was underweight in U.S. equities, large
companies and credit, and was already looking to acquire five or six smaller one billion
dollar stakes in large U.S. financial institutions when Citigroup came calling), id.,
concentrating the full investment into a single company whose financial future was tenuous
(and investing about fifty percent more into the asset class than they had anticipated) does
not fit ADIA's traditional conservative strategy.
BUSINESSWEEK

145. ADIA's current arbitration claim against Citigroup seeks damages of 4 billion
dollars, Chris Dade, Abu Dhabi to Sue Citigroupfr $4 Billion, DIGITAL JOURNAL (Dec. 16,
2009), http://digitaljournal.com/article/283935, which would bring the overall value of the
investment to $8.06 billion, including $3.12 billion in interest payments (assuming that
ADIA exercises the one-year extension option, making the conversion date March 2011 and
implying a holding period of forty months), and a market price for common shares of $4.01
per share on December 7, 2009 (not reflecting the impact of a later 1:10 reverse stock split),
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investment opportunities in the future. Despite its size and political
nature, nothing in the deal suggests that it was mercantilist; ADIA
acquired only convertible debt and remained a passive investor. As
in Kuwait, large arms sales to the U.A.E. were announced in 2009
through 2010, which may have been part of the implicit political bargain in the transaction.
Outside of ADIA, Abu Dhabi's SWFs are more aggressive.
ADICU invests primarily within Abu Dhabi and is not averse to taking large stakes in companies targeted for investment. ADICU owns
majority shares in the NBAD, 146 the ADCB, 147 Union National

Bank 148 and Al Hilal Bank, 149 and large stakes in numerous other
domestic companies. 150 The majority stakes in domestic banks are
particularly relevant because they guarantee that the domestic financial sector is ultimately responsible to the state (and thus to the al
Nahyan family). Through these intermediary financial institutions, it
is possible to carefully manage the development of Abu Dhabi's
economy, ensuring that political allies are more easily able to access
credit markets. The scandal involving the Saad Group and Algosaibi
& Brothers Company is illustrative of the kind of name-based lending that occurs on a regular basis throughout the Middle East. 151 Fursee Citigroup, Inc., New Common Stock Chart, YAHOO! FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com

/echarts?s C+interactive#chart7:symbol c;range 20091203,20101203;indicator split+volu
me;charttype line;crosshair-on;ohlcvalues 0;logscale on;source undefined (last visited
Oct. 15, 2011) (indicating an 87.4% decline in value relative to the conversion price of
$31.83 per share). This would make the annualized return on the investment about two
percent. In all likelihood, the suit is a negotiating tactic designed to prompt a renegotiation

of the conversion price in a manner similar to the conversion rate reset on the KIA's
preferred shares.
146. Shareholding Pattern,NAT'L BANK OF ABU DHABI, http://www.nbad.com/investor/
stock/ownership.php (last visited Oct. 15, 2011).
147. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, ARABIAN Bus., http://www.arabianbusiness.com/
companies/abu-dhabi-commercial-bank-66462.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2011).
148.

Union National Bank, GULFBASE, available at http://www.gulfbase.com/site/

interface/CompanyProfileSummary.aspx?c= 186 (last visited Oct. 29, 2011) (indicating that
the Abu Dhabi Investment Council owns a 50. 1% share).
149.

Abu Dhabi

to Launch Al Hilal Bank,

ARABIAN Bus.

(Aug.

1, 2007),

http://www.arabianbusiness.com/abu-dhabi-launch-al-hilal-bank- I99340.html.
150. Direct Investments, ABU DHABI INV. COUNCIL, http://www.adcouncil.ae
/BusinessFunctions/Directlnvestments/tabid/67/Default.aspx (last visited Oct. 15, 2011)
("legacy portfolio consisting of 12 investments in local financial institutions and other

prominent companies").
151.

Saad Group defaulted on a $1 billion debt in May 2009, forcing regulators across

the Middle East to ask numerous banks to mark down overall loans to the groups (which

were approximately ten billion dollars) by fifty to seventy-five percent. In the aftermath,

[50:1

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

ther, the provision of mortgage loans based on the reputation of the
owner of the target property, rather than the creditworthiness of the
borrower, was very common. 152 Overall, Abu Dhabi has used the
subsidiaries of its SWFs to provide easy credit and cash payments to
domestic political allies. This behavior is autonomy-maximizing because it incentivizes loyalty to the royal family, thereby increasing
the range of actions that the royal family can undertake without leading to political resistance.
In a similar vein, IPIC has traditionally made large investments in the petrochemicals sector. 153 This strategy is consistent
with autonomy-maximization. By purchasing large or controlling
stakes in downstream petrochemical companies, 154 IPIC secures maralmost every bank in the Gulf saw an increase in debt renegotiation and restructuring by
family-owned businesses, reflecting widespread concern. As was noted in the Arabic press,
banks simply made lending decisions based on reputation rather than the underlying
business. As a measure of how integral these loans are to the political bargain in the region,
the U.A.E. Central Bank gave exposed banks access to lending facilities to resolve any
liquidity problems caused by the markdown, effectively backstopping the bad loans, since
both the Central Bank and the commercial banks are government-controlled. GCC The
Saad-Algosaibi Disaster, EXEC. MAGAZINE (Sept. 2009), available at http:/executivemagazine.com/ getarticle.php?article 12201; Mark Townsend, Saudi Scandal Lifts Veil on
Gulf

Finance,

INSTITUTIONAL

INVESTOR

(Oct.

1,

2009),

http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/Popups/ PrintArticle.aspx?ArticlelD 2307525.
152. Information obtained from personal interviews with company owners in Abu Dhabi
between November 17 and 25, 2006 and January 21 and 23, 2008. For post-crisis
independent confirmation that name lending was common, see ME Lending Slumps to 5Year
Low,
TRADEARABIA
(Dec.
18,
2009),
http://www.tradearabia.com/news/bank_172003.html; IPRA-GC Con/krence 2011 Opens in
Abu Dhabi, AL BAWABA (Apr. 14, 2011), http://www.albawaba.com/ipra-gc-conference201 1-opens-abu-dhabi ("through practices such as 'name lending,' many businesses used to
get by on reputation alone").
153. IPIC has made some extraordinary investments most notably in acquiring a
16.3% stake in Barclays. This investment is probably best explained as an exercise of
Sheikh Mansour's personal autonomy, the limits of which were made clearer when pressure
from within Abu Dhabi led IPIC to reduce its stake to a more traditional five percent. The
reasons for acquiring a stake in a western financial institution at all probably mirror those
that led to investments in Citigroup by ADIA and the KIA, and in Merrill Lynch by the KIA.
154. Such companies include OMV AG, Borealis, CEPSA, PAK Arab Refinery and
Oman Polypropylene, among others. Moody's Publishes Credit Opinion on International
Petroleum Investment, AMEINFO (Apr. 28, 2009), http://www.ameinfo.com/ 194324.html;
PAK-ARAB REFINERY LIMITED (PARCO), http://www.parco.com.pk/ (last accessed Oct. 29,
2011) ("40% of the shares are held by Emirate of Abu Dhabi through its Abu Dhabi
Petroleum Investment Company L.L.C. ("ADPI"), a subsidiary group of International
Petroleum Investment Company"); Prema Viswanthan, Oman PP Reduces OP Rates at PP

Plant

on

Feedstock

Shortage,

ICIS

ONLINE,

http://www.icis.com/Articles/

2010/06/11/9366972/corrected-oman-pp-reduces-op-rates-at-pp-plant-on-feedstock-
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kets for Abu Dhabi's oil exports. This decreases Abu Dhabi's vulnerability to oil price shocks and potentially creates channels for oil
sales higher than OPEC quota levels. Similarly, by purchasing large
or controlling shares in upstream service providers like Oil Search
and Arab Petroleum Pipelines Co., among others, IPIC ensures that
Abu Dhabi will have access to the technology and human resources
needed to keep oil production levels high as existing reserves decline.
So, by purchasing petrochemical sector companies, IPIC increases
Abu Dhabi's ability to sustain oil sales and production autonomously.
Mubadala also pursues an aggressive investment strategy. It
has taken a share greater than five percent in some sixty-three companies, many of which are Western corporations. Some of these
companies even operate in traditionally sensitive industrial sectors
like aviation 155 and electronics. 156 Mubadala's investments follow
exactly the kind of activist investment pattern that worries many
Western investors. The investments are explicitly made to steer future expansion by those companies to Abu Dhabi. 157 Acquisitions in
the aviation and aerospace sector were made in conjunction with the
1 58
construction of a new airport terminal and airport free trade zone
and all fit within an expressed public policy goal. 159 Investments in
the Guinea Alumina Corporation, the Emirates Aluminum Company 160 and Spyker Cars 161 were all made to develop a seamless supply
shortage.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2011) ("International Petroleum Investment Co (IPIC).
hold[s] a 20% stake in Oman Polypropylene.").
155.

Seventy percent of SR Technics and thirty-two percent of Piaggio Aero Industries.

MUBADALA, ANNUAL REPORT 2010, at 42 (2010), available at mubadala.ae/images/uploads/

MubadalaARIOEnglish.pdf.
156.

A twenty percent share in Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. Id.

157.

Id.

158.

See Abu Dhabi InternationalAirport, ABU DHABI GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS, http://

business.abudhabi.ae/egovPoolPortalWAR/appmanager/ADeGP/Business?_nfpb=true&_p
ageLabel=P6800317491243425964701 &did=124726&lang=en (last visited Oct. 29, 2011).

Competition with Dubai's new Jebel Ali Airport City was almost certainly an additional
factor in these investment decisions, as maximizing future policy options that would accrue
to the emirate whose airport was more successful required activist investments in western
companies. For a view of inter-emirate competition manifested in aviation, see Rulers olthe
New Silk Road, THE ECONOMIST (June 3, 2010), available at http://www.econ omist.com/
node/16271573 (last visited Oct. 29, 2011).
159.

See THE EXEC. COUNCIL, POLICY AGENDA 2007-2008:

THE EMIRATE OF ABU

DHABI 50 51, available at http://mubadala.ae/images/uploads/Policy-Agenda_2007_-_20
08.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2011).
160. Asa Fitch, UAE Rises in Ranks ofAluminium Majors, THE NATIONAL (Apr. 24,
2011), http://www.thenational.ae/business/economy/uae-rises-in-ranks-of-aluminium-majors
(last visited Oct. 29, 2011).
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chain for aluminum that would create thousands of new jobs in Abu
Dhabi. 162 Developing and diversifying the economy inside Abu
Dhabi simply does not make sense for a SWF that is looking to maximize profits because Abu Dhabi's sole competitive advantages are
access to petroleum and subsidized energy. 163 However, in developing state-owned "private sector" industries, Mubadala is expanding
the "private sector" opportunities for future generations of Abu Dhabi's citizens. Eventually, this should enable reductions in civil service positions while retaining royal control over citizens' employment. 164 Mubadala has also taken large stakes in non-oil energy
companies 165 in order to ensure continued state control over energy in
Abu Dhabi. Thus, overall, it is clear that Mubadala's investment activity is autonomy-maximizing. Further, by separating these aggressive strategies from ADIA, any political backlash against Mubadala's
investments will not restrict ADIA's ability to invest Abu Dhabi's
primary reserves.
In summary, the formation of ADIA, placing control at the
sub-national level and the proliferation of new SWFs can best be described as choices made to ensure the autonomy of the ruling family.
ADIA's general strategy of investing internationally for profit is not
inconsistent with this goal. Indeed, its tendency to invest below re161.

Spyker

automobiles

are

primarily

manufactured

from

aluminum.

See

Craftsmanship, SPYKERCARS, http://www.spykercars.nl/?pag=26 (last visited Oct. 29, 2011).

162. See Soren Billing, Mubadala Will Grow Asset Base Thre/bild in 5 Years, ARABIAN
BUSINESS (Apr. 29, 2009), http://www.arabianbusiness.com/property/article/554074-mubad
ala-will-grow-asset-base-threefold-in-5-years-.
163. Abu Dhabi has a small workforce and relies on temporary immigrant workers for
its labor supply, its fresh water is created by energy-intensive desalination plants and, with
the sizeable exception of petroleum, it has no natural resources. The Emirate's "Economic
Vision: 2030" lists its competitive advantages as petroleum and natural gas reserves, low
energy costs, a world-class transport system, relatively affordable skilled labor and its
geographical position. See Section 3: Engines ofAbu Dhabi's Future Economic Growth in
ECONOMIC VISION: 2030, available at http://www.masdarcity.ae/userfiles/files/economicvision-2030-section-3.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2011). Suffice it to say that the ability to
import labor is not traditionally thought of as an economic advantage and the emirate's
geographic position is not particularly distinguishable from any number of other emirates
and countries located in the Middle East.
164. If these companies are privatized at some point in the future, the process will likely
result in disproportionate benefits for political allies. Even if privatization is executed such
that all citizens benefit equally, this would have the autonomy-boosting effect of reducing
demands on ADIA funds. Offering citizens ownership of observable large domestic
companies would likely eliminate demands on the more substantial assets held by ADIA.
165. Including Dolphin Energy and the Abu Dhabi Future Energy Company (Masdar).
MUBADALA ANNUAL REPORT 2010, supra note 155, at 42.
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porting thresholds lends credence to an autonomy-maximizing strategy rather than a mercantilist one. While some commentators have
suggested that ADIA's extraordinary investment in Citigroup during
the financial crisis points to a mercantilist strategy, 166 our analysis
suggests that it too can best be explained in autonomy-maximizing
terms. The size and nature of the transactions need to be viewed in
the context of the global crisis and the relationship between the United States and Abu Dhabi. Living up to the commitments implied by
its relationship with a great power is essential for a small ruling elite
that is vulnerable to internal and external threats. Finally, the more
aggressive investment strategies of IPIC, ADICU (including the provision of favorable loans to political allies) and Mubadala also fit this
explanation. They are meant to stabilize the current balance of power
within the royal family and maintain the unified front presented by
existing elites, thereby preventing vulnerability to demands made by
other segments of society and protecting the autonomy of the ruling
elite.
C. Singapore

Unlike the governments in both Kuwait and Abu Dhabi, Singapore is not a hereditary monarchy. Further, unlike those political
entities' SWFs, Singapore's Temasek Holdings ("Temasek") and
Government of Singapore Investment Corporation ("GIC") are not
funded by natural resource revenues. Despite these differences in local conditions, the creation, structure and actions of Singapore's
SWFs are best explained by autonomy-maximization. Indeed, no
other country has so openly embraced economic management as a
means to protect the autonomy of the ruling elite both internally and
externally. The initial creation of SWFs in Singapore increased the
autonomy of Singapore's People's Action Party ("PAP"); 167 so, too,
has the evolution of Temasek and the GIC. Just as with KIA and
Abu Dhabi's SWFs, the normal investment patterns of these SWFs,
as well as their extraordinary actions (interventions in the domestic
stock market, purchases of large stakes in Chinese and American
166.

See Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 6, at 1348 50.

167. The PAP has held power in Singapore since the creation of the state due to the
country's pluralist voting system. As a sign of its dominance, the party held every seat in
the legislature from 1968 until 1980. See Party Milestones, PEOPLE'S ACTION PARTY (Oct.
15, 2011), http://www.pap.org.sg/partyhistory.php.
The PAP currently holds all but six
seats. Shamim Adam & Weiyi Lim, Singapore s Lee Retains Pover With Smallest Margin
Since 1965, BLOOMBERG NEWS (May 7, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-0507/singapore-s-people-s-action-party-keeps-parliamentary-majority-state-says.html.
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banks, providing assurance for the Barclays IPO and recapitalizing
CAO) fit the pattern of autonomy-maximization but cannot be explained with any of the other theories we explored above.
Singapore's elites have always been conscious of the issue of
external autonomy, and it is not hard to see why. Singapore's political history has been marked by British colonization, Japanese military occupation and other turmoil since its very creation. Other than
the brief reign of a puppet sultan in the nineteenth century, Singapore
had been controlled by or subsumed within some foreign power from
its inception until it gained independence in 1965.168 An independent
republic, Singapore is wedged between Malaysia and Indonesia.
Although over seventy-five percent of the population is ethnic Chinese, 169 the presence of a substantial Malay minority has prompted its
neighbors to express their desire to see regional "ethnic solidarity"
from time to time, ensuring that stability is never certain. For example, Indonesia sponsored terrorist attacks in Singapore during the
1960s to foment racial riots as part of its bet to prevent the unification of the Malaysian peninsula. Relations with Malaysia, the country from which Singapore separated, have also remained tense. Malaysia disputed Singapore's maritime claims until 1995,170 and
Singapore is also completely reliant on the Malaysian state of Johor
for its drinking water. 171 It is therefore unsurprising that Singapore's
72
elites have approached politics with a rather realist interpretation. 1
168. Singapore was originally carved out of Malay territory when the British installed
and recognized the exiled elder brother of the Sultan of Johor as the ruler of Singapore to
provide a base for British activity in the otherwise Dutch-controlled straits. See Barbara
Leitch LePoer, Chapter 1: HistoricalSetting, in LIBRARY OF CONG. FED. RESEARCH Div.,
SINGAPORE: A COUNTRY STUDY (1989), available at lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/sgtoc.html.
After the British East India Company deposed the Sultan and took full control five years
later, the British ruled Singapore until 1939. With Britain's naval forces engaged in
defending the home islands against Germany, Japanese forces quickly defeated the skeleton
British defenses and imposed a brutal occupation regime in which Chinese civilians were
massacred in retaliation for ongoing resistance against Japan in mainland China. The British
reassumed control of Singapore after the end of the war and set Singapore on a path to
independence. After securing full internal self-government in 1959, Singapore temporarily
merged into Malaysia in 1963 (becoming independent of the U.K.) but was expelled in 1965
and forced to fend for itself as an independent state. MICHAEL LEIFER, SINGAPORE'S
FOREIGN POLICY: COPING WITH VULNERABILITY 4 (2000); LePoer, supra.
169.

See LEIFER, supra note 168, at 1.

170.

Id. at2.

171.

Jd. at4.

172.

As early as 1966, Singapore's first prime minister (and still the dominant figure in

Singaporean politics), Lee Kuan Yew, said, "inthe last resort it is power which decides what
happens and, therefore, it behoves [sic] us to ensure that we always have overwhelming
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Given that Singapore is, however, a tiny country relative to its
neighbors (much less relative to whatever global power has been ascendant at a given time), it has never been able to rely strictly on military power to secure its existence. Relying on a sense of historical
legitimacy within the region was an equally untenable plan given
Singapore's origins as an imperialist outpost.
At independence, the domestic situation was equally tenuous.
The country's per capita GDP was under $400 and unemployment
was high. Singapore's entrep6t-based economy could not provide
enough jobs to defuse racial tensions over employment, and industrial infrastructure was minimal; 173 a concerted industrial development
policy was urgently needed. 174 As others have commented, the only
way to "wean the native Malay population from ethnic politics was
through the appeal of social democratic policies," 175 but full socialism was impossible absent a union with the Malay hinterland. Therefore, when the merger experiment between Singapore and Malaysia
failed, the PAP was forced to embark on an alternate path.
As Lee Kuan Yew, the first Prime Minister of the Republic of
Singapore, would later explain, the PAP "decided soon after independence to link Singapore up with the advanced countries and make
[them]selves a hub or nodal point for the expansion and extension of
their activities." 176 This initial industrial policy was carried out
through substantial investments and subsidized loans made by the
Economic Development Board into domestic and foreign companies.
The twin tactics served the dual purposes of creating vested foreign
interests in the continued viability of Singapore as an autonomous
state and creating employment for the working class to quiet ethnic
tensions. 177
power on our side." Id. at 5.
173. RAJ VASIL, GOVERNING

SINGAPORE:

A HISTORY OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND

DEMOCRACY 5 (2000).

174.

Id.at6.

175. A political party is essentially in the business of acquiring and maintaining power.
In older Western democracies, because of the nature of the citizenry and the open and
competitive political environment, power is seen as a means to implementing policies,

preferences and priorities. However, in newly independent states, power was tied more
directly to the exploitation of primordial loyalties and the distribution of patronage: policy
success could not be relied on as voters were not sufficiently educated to make rational
choices based on evidence. Id. at 8-9.
176.

LEIFER, supra note 168, at 12.

177. Interestingly, these investments were largely funded by mandatory contributions
from Singapore's work force to Singapore's Central Provident Fund, which was established
in 1955. See Mukul G. Asher, COMPULSORY SAVINGS IN SINGAPORE: AN ALTERNATIVE TO
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By requiring private savings to be paid into the Central Provident Fund ("CPF") and incentivizing additional private purchases of
government bonds, Singapore managed to co-opt a substantial pool
of private capital into the service of the government. 17 8 Critically,
given Singapore's young population at the time, the CPF's liabilities
would not come due for decades. The allocation of assets, however,
would be specifically approved by government bureaucrats according
to current policy goals. 179 Therefore, the move can be interpreted as
serving two goals. First, it created a public perception that the PAP
was critically responsible for the country's new private sector
growth. Second, it created a financial cushion to ward off economic
downturns. This, in turn, assured that the PAP would be able to provide continued economic growth and stability even during times of
economic shocks-thereby protecting the autonomy of the ruling
elite.
In addition, the country pursued an active industrial policy to
accelerate growth and position Singapore as a critical economy in the
Far East. According to Suppiah Dhanabalan, the longtime Chairman
of Temasek, Singapore incentivized capital investments in manufacturing from both local and foreign sources by taking minority stakes
THE WELFARE STATE 1 (Nat'l Ctr. for Policy Analysis, Policy Rep. No. 198, 1995), available
at
http://portal.jnu.edu.cn/publish/uploadFile/2970/eWebEditor/20100713084009226.pdf,
Looking Back, CENTRAL PROVIDENT FUND BOARD, http://mycpf.cpf.gov.sg/CPF/AboutUs/HistoryofCPF.htm (last updated June 30, 2011). This imposition of a mandatory savings

regime on the labor force, combined with Singapore's welcoming attitude toward laborintensive industries, LePoer, supra note 168 ("A four-year development plan, launched
under Minister of Finance Goh Keng Swee in 1961 . . . set aside a large area of swamp
wasteland as an industrial estate in the Jurong area and emphasized labor-intensive industries
.... "), created a substantial pool of capital for the government to redeploy toward additional
industries. Conservative fiscal policies, see Country Watch: Singapore, ASIAN FINANCE,

Sept. 15, 1989, at 83, also discouraged local consumption, further accelerating the
accumulation of capital. Finally, through the EDB's efforts to ensure diversification via
selective deployment of this cheap capital, the effects of Dutch Disease were mostly
avoided. See SINGAPORE INFLATION RATE, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/singapore/
inflation-cpi (indicating that Singapore's average annual inflation from 1962 to 2010 was

2.73 percent).
178. See GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: How HUMAN
PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM 125

(2009) (discussing Lee Kuan Yew's policies of mandatory pension contributions and other
policies to boost domestic saving rates).
179.

The CPF is a provident fund, so in addition to paying out a single lump sum to

pensioners upon retirement, it also gives citizens the ability to withdraw some funds for
specifically approved purposes such as housing, tertiary education and health care costs. See
ARMANDO BARRIENTOS, COMPARING PENSION SCHEMES IN CHILE, SINGAPORE, BRAZIL, AND

SOUTH AFRICA 8-10 (IDPM Discussion Series, Paper No. 67, 2002).
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in companies and making subsidized loans through the Economic
Development Board ("EDB"). 180 In an effort to separate regulatory
and business functions, the government transferred EDB's industrial
loan portfolio to DBS Bank in 1968 and transferred EDB's equity
holdings to the Ministry of Finance. 181 During this early period, a
special department within the Ministry of Finance managed these
holdings.182 However, in 1974 the department was reorganized into
Temasek, a limited liability company owned by the Ministry. 183 This
raises questions as to why a special entity was needed and whether
this reorganization served primarily administrative functions or other
goals.
The official story is, of course, that the creation of Temasek
was simply a decision made to separate the business and regulatory
functions of the government to increase efficiency. 184 Given that the
transfer of the EDB's equities to the Ministry of Finance was supposed to achieve this same goal, however, Temasek seems a bit redundant. Additionally, the timing was somewhat suspect, as one
would have anticipated that Temasek would have been created at the
same time that the EDB's loan portfolio was used to capitalize DBS
Bank six years earlier. Finally, the fact that Singapore's regulatory
bodies continued to protect monopolies held by Temasek-controlled
companies' 85 suggests that the separation of regulatory and equity interests does not initially seem to have caused any tangible changes in
regulatory policy.
Mercantilist theory offers little insight on the creation of a
separate government-owned corporation: the distinction between
channeling capital accumulation through a Ministry or a Ministry180. Suppiah Dhanabalan, Chairman, Temasek Holdings, Governance and Sustainable
Institution: A Personal Perspective, Remarks at the 6th Mizuho Global Seminar in Tokyo
(May 17, 2010),

14 (transcript available at http://www.temasek.com.sg/mediacentre/

speeches?detailid=8598).
181.

Dhanabalan, supra note 180.

182.

Id.

183.

Id.

14 17.

184. Dhanabalan has said that "Temasek was formed simply to take a load off a
Government which had other priorities and by forming Temasek, the government could be
sure that there could be an independently focused, professionally managed and commercially
disciplined approach to investments and managing businesses." Id. 1 19.
185. Burton Ong, who discusses the likely impact of Singapore's new competition law
on government affiliated companies, calls such companies "large Singapore companies who
[sic] shares are held, entirely or substantially, by Temasek Holdings." See Burton Ong, The
Origins, Objectives and Structure of Competition Law in Singapore, 29 WORLD
COMPETITION 269, 272 n.8 (2006).
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owned corporation is irrelevant because either can be used to ensure
that capital stays within the country. Creating Temasek as an independent entity does not support the account that Singapore's SWFs
are imperialist-capitalists either. When a country is trying to capture
above-market rents through the imposition of imperial force, it would
seem to be beneficial to keep a direct link between its equity investments and the state. That way, investment targets would be more
compliant for fear of the political consequences of resisting the SWF.
Rather, the creation of Temasek is consistent with the actions of a rational market-based investor: vesting investment decisions in an autonomous company should increase returns over those generated by
officials within a politicized Ministry of Finance.
The creation of Temasek is also consistent with the autonomy-maximization theory advanced in this paper, especially when
considering the timing of the creation of this sovereign wealth fund
within its broader geopolitical context. Temasek was incorporated in
the same year that American forces withdrew from Vietnam. This
threatened to disrupt the tenuous balance of power in Southeast Asia
that Singapore had worked carefully to create. 186 By shifting its portfolio of equities to a formal corporation separated from the government, Singapore signaled to the West that it was committed to capitalist principles while the Ministry of Finance's retention of the
equity interest in Temasek (and the fact that the new company was
largely staffed by civil servants) 187 signaled to the socialist world that
Singapore was not fully in the pocket of Western interests. By adopting corporate formalities while retaining certain socialist aspects,
Singapore was able to chart a middle ground that kept all sides interested in Singapore's continued viability and protected the autonomy
of the PAP.
Funding is another mechanism by which Singapore's government, and thus the PAP, retains control over Temasek. Despite
186.

During the 1960s and 1970s, Singapore's leaders promoted trade relations with

Moscow, believing that a Soviet role in Southeast Asia would ensure the permanent interest
of the United States in the region. By involving both the Soviet Union and the United States
as counterweights to China (the presumptive regional power), Singapore managed to carve
out a fair amount of autonomy for itself rather than being captured under any particular
power's "sphere of influence." See LePoer, supra note 168. Interestingly, by avoiding any
commitment to a neutral foreign policy, while remaining part of the Non-Aligned
Movement, Singapore also managed to keep each of these larger powers interested in the
continued security of Singapore-which lent some protection against regional threats
coming from Indonesia and Malaysia. Id.
187. Temasek was initially staffed by seconded and retired civil servants. Dhanabalan,
supra note 180, 120.
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occasional protests that Temasek should not be considered a conventional SWF because it receives only small capital injections from the
government from time to time rather than on a regular basis,' 88 Singapore's capital injection in 2008 of close to S$21 billion'8 9 was
equal to more than ten percent of Temasek's portfolio value at the
time. 190 While this occurred in the midst of the global financial crisis, it serves to illustrate the central role of Temasek in Singapore's
economic policy. Further, as a Fifth Schedule Company, 191 Temasek
must obtain the approval of the Singaporean President if the value of
its portfolio falls below what it was when the current government
took office. 192 Since the PAP ensured that its nominee for president
ran unopposed by any viable alternative candidate from Singapore's
independence through 2011, the presidential approval requirement
ensured that the PAP would have a veto right over Temasek's annual
budget for a full election cycle even if the party were to lose its majority in Parliament. 193 In the 2011 presidential race, the PAP did not
officially endorse a candidate for the presidency and allowed four
candidates to qualify. Of the four, however, three were former PAP
members, and the winner, Tony Tan Keng Yam, was the PAP's favored candidate and a long-serving PAP cabinet member, former

188. Suppiah Dhanabalan, Chairman, Temasek Holdings, The Role of Sovereign Funds
in Today's Globalization, Speech at The Indus Entrepreneurs Event (Aug. 21, 2008), 1112728 (transcript available at http://www.temasekholdings.com.sg/media-centre-news_
speeches_210808.htm).
189.

Apres Ho Ching, Le Deluge?, ASIA SENTINEL (Feb. 9, 2009), http://www.asia

sentinel.com/index.php?option comcontent&task view&id 171 0&Itemid 233&limit- 1&
limitstart=l ("[L]ast financial year its portfolio value rose by thirteen percent to S$185
billion but much of this was apparently accounted for by an official injection.").
190. See
Our
Portolio
Value
Since
Inception,
http://www.temasekreport.com/2010/portfolio/inception.html.

TEMASEK

(2010),

191. Fifth Schedule companies are designated by Singapore's Constitution as
government-affiliated companies. They need special approval from the President on certain
matters of governance. Other Fifth Schedule entities include the Central Provident Fund

Board, Government of Singapore Investment Corporation and the Monetary Authority of
Singapore. See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE, July 1, 1999, Fifth Schedule,

arts. 22A, 22C.
192.

Id.

193. The PAP has used the government's election board to disqualify opposition
candidates for president since constitutional amendments first required direct elections of the
president in 1991.
See Presidential Election 1999, SINGAPORE ELECTIONS,
http://www.singapore-elections.com/pres-elec/1999.html
(last visited Jan. 7, 2011);
Presidential Election 2005, SINGAPORE ELECTIONS, http://www.singapore-elections.com
/pres-elec/2005.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2011).
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deputy Prime Minister and the former head of GIC. 194 The implications of the 2011 election are unclear, but for the moment the PAP
195
retains control of both Parliament and the presidency.
Temasek's sister fund, GIC, was established more recently in
1981. It serves as another illustration of how small states use economic resources to placate major powers on whose goodwill they ultimately depend. By 1981, Singapore's economy had developed significantly and had emerged as one of the Asian tigers and dragons
(alongside Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea) due at least in part
to an aggressive export-led growth strategy. 196 In addition, the economy was generating both persistent positive cash flows (through Temasek's investment in domestic companies1 97) and new low-cost capital (from individual savings in the Central Provident Fund).1 98 There
was simply too much money available to invest solely within Singapore. Moreover, there was increasing international pressure on Singapore and other countries with substantial accumulations of excess
reserves to recycle them for the benefit of the global economy, especially in the aftermath of the oil crisis, which had exposed vulnerabilities in the Western export markets. 199 Thus, it was fairly apparent
that international investment opportunities should be pursued. However, investments into foreign public corporations by a holding company for what were essentially state-owned enterprises probably
would not have been warmly received in Western democracies. Establishing a separate institution to manage Singapore's excess reve-

194.
2011),
.html.
195.

Chun Han Wong, Tony Tan Elected President(f#Singapore, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 28,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904787404576534873643392148
Id.

196.

The deeper reasons for the East Asian "miracle" continue to be debated. While
BANK, EMERGING
ASIA: CHANGES AND CHALLENGES (1997), others emphasize broader industrial policies, see,

some attribute it primarily to export-led growth, see, e.g., ASIAN DEV.

e.g., ROBERT WADE, GOVERNING THE MARKET:

ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ROLE OF

GOVERNMENT IN EAST ASIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION

(1990);

THE WORLD BANK, THE EAST

ASIAN MIRACLE: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PUBLIC POLICY (1993).

197.

See supra note 185 and accompanying text.

198. See Margaret Sullivan, Chapter 3: The Economy, in SINGAPORE: A COUNTRY
STUDY, supra note 168 ("Every employed Singaporean or permanent resident was

automatically a member of Central Provident Fund, although some self-employed people
were not. Membership grew from 180,000 in 1955 to 2.08 million in 1989. At the end of
1988, the 2.06 million members of the Central Provident Fund had S$32.5 billion to their
credit.").
199. Bela Balassa, The Nei ly-industrializingDeveloping Countries After the Oil Crisis,
117 WELTWIRTSCHAFTLICHES ARCHIVE 142, 165 (1981).
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nues allowed for a distinction to be made between the hands-on domestic economic policies of the PAP implemented through Temasek
and the country's international investments. Thus, establishing the
GIC enabled Singapore to access a broader range of investment opportunities without triggering a political backlash.
As discussed in the Abu Dhabi case study, creating a separate
SWF for domestic and foreign investments also prevents management or employees at either fund from establishing a powerful competing locus of authority with ties to both domestic businesses and international actors. This approach protects the existing privileged
position and autonomy of local elites. In the case of Singapore, the
political importance of controlling SWFs and the investment opportunities they provide is illustrated by the fact that Lee Kuan Yew became chairman of GIC at a time when he was still serving as the
200
country's prime minister and has retained this position ever since.
Further, establishing a second SWF expands the institutional space
available to reward allies or sideline potential rivals and ensures their
loyalty to the ruling elite. 20 1
Specializing investment functions is, of course, also perfectly
consistent with profit maximization. Moreover, the shift to international investments is a move capitalist or socialist imperialist accounts predict. 20 2 However, closer inspection of GIC's financial resources and their management strongly point towards autonomymaximization. GIC receives money from the public budget. However, because part of the CPF's portfolio is Singaporean government
bonds, the CPF functions to mobilize the mandatory contributions by
Singaporean employees-a cheap source of captive capital-to facilitate GIC's activities abroad. 20 3 This ingratiates the PAP with the
international community, signaling that it is a cooperative player in
rebalancing global currency accounts. It also allows the PAP to increase the size of Singapore's reserves relatively easily since its cost
of capital is so low. (This increase serves as propaganda each year to
boost popular domestic support for the PAP.) These easy returns are
200. Note that Lee Kuan Yew served as prime minister of Singapore for thirty-one
years, from 1959 until 1990. See Not Fade Aw ay, THE ECONOMIST (May 16, 2011),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2011/05/singapore politics.

201. See inira note 209 (discussing the career patterns of management personnel at the
two funds).
202.
203.

See supra note 9 and accompanying discussion.
The CPF guarantees pensioners a return of 3.5%, and GIC's average returns are

reported to be about 9%. See Shawn Crispin, Cracks Appear in Lee's Mantle, ASIA TIMES
ONLINE (Mar. 20, 2009), http://www.atimes.com/atimes/SoutheastAsia/KC20Ae02.html.

The GIC is then able to retain these excess profits to boost its balance sheet.
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also used to justify high salaries for GIC employees-even those who
serve in ex officio positions 20 4-which serves to increase the attractiveness of remaining on good terms with the PAP rather than mounting a political challenge.
So far we have argued that the establishment of separate entities to manage funds that could be invested to boost domestic development or to invest internationally supports the autonomy maximization theory advanced in this article. We now extend this argument
and suggest that the governance structure of both funds lends further
credence to our theory.
Temasek's formal governance structure is the same as that of
conventional limited liability companies found in the West. 20 5 Senior
management is selected and overseen by a board of directors, which
is in turn elected by shareholders. 2 6 The official line is that the
Board is independent of the government because a majority of its directors are "non-executive independent private sector business leaders." 20 7 However, Temasek's sole shareholder is the Ministry of Finance, making it questionable how effective the presence of a Board
is in separating Temasek from the government. Clearly, in the event
of any substantial disagreement between the party and the Board over
Temasek's strategy or actions, it would be relatively simple for the
Ministry of Finance to call a shareholder meeting to replace the entire
slate of directors. Further, the appointment or removal of directors to
Fifth Schedule Companies like Temasek requires Presidential approval under Singapore's Constitution. 208 Additional evidence comes
from the staffing of top positions at Temasek, which are filled by
PAP insiders, ensuring PAP influence on Temasek's day-to-day ac204. Singapore's government ministers earn average salaries of $1.2 million
Hsien Loong earns more than $2million. Id.

and Lee

205. The Singapore Companies Act applies to closely held as well as publicly traded
corporations. Its core governance provision mirrors, for example, Section 141 of the
Delaware General Corporate Law by stating that the company is managed by or under the

direction of the board of directors.

For a summary of the key aspects of Singapore's

company law, see Company Law, SINGAPORE LAW, http://www.singaporelaw.sg/content
/CompanyLaw.html (last updated Apr. 30, 2009).
206. Relating to Our Stakeholders, TEMASEK (2010), http://www.temasekreport.com/
2010/governance/shareholders.html.
Temasek also maintains an "International Panel"
comprised of international business leaders. This panel does not exercise any supervisory or
direct authority over Temasek and generally serves as an advisory panel for the Board. See
Dhanabalan, supra note 188,
37 38.
207.

Relating to Our Stakeholders, supra note 206.

208. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE, July 1, 1999, Fifth Schedule, arts.
22A, 22C.
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tivities. Most obviously, the CEO of Temasek, Ho Ching, is the wife
of Lee Hsien Loong, Singapore's current prime minister and the son
of Lee Kuan Yew. Further, Ho Ching was nominated to be CEO
shortly after her husband was elected Prime Minister, suggesting that
her selection is part of a strategy to transfer power to the next generation of the Lee Kuan Yew cartel. 20 9 The Chairman of the Board,
Suppiah Dhanabalan, is another example. He worked at the EDB
prior to its funds being transferred to Temasek, was a prominent PAP
politician during the 1980s, 210 held numerous ministerial portfolios
211
and remains a key member of the Lee Kuan Yew inner circle.
In defense of the rather clubby (and somewhat nepotistic) appointments, Lee Hsien Loong has said that Singapore is "such a small
society if you want everybody to be disconnected from everybody
else, we just don't have the bodies.' 212 Perhaps this is true on some
level, but it would certainly be possible to find non-family and even
non-party members to fill these positions. Temasek's governance
structure therefore allows the PAP to maintain control over Temasek
which in turn facilitates the PAP's ongoing efforts to guide Singapore's economy and retain control of the government.
The Chip Goodyear fiasco at Temasek provides a good example of how its governance structure does not actually isolate the
Board from political considerations. In February 2009, Temasek announced that Chip Goodyear would become Temasek's new CEO,
replacing Ms. Ho as of October 2009.213 However, the transfer of
power never materialized and Goodyear left the company in the
summer of 2009. Officially, there was a conflict in management
style and strategy. 214 It was, perhaps, a pleasant way to state that
Goodyear had proven unexpectedly resistant to suggestions from the
209.

Wilson Ng, The Evolution of Sovereign Wealth Funds: Singapore's Temasek

Holdings, 18 J. FIN. REG. & COMPLIANCE 6 (2010).
210.

SUNANDA K. DATTA-RAY, LOOKING EAST TO LOOK WEST:

LEE KUAN YEW'S

MISSION INDIA 24 (2009).
211. Anne Hyland, Singapore's Mr. Buffet, AUSTL. FIN. REV.
http://www.singapore-window.org/sw02/020524afhtm.
212.

(May 24, 2002),

Id.

213. Mr. Charles "Chip " Goodyear to Succeed as CEO qf Tenasek, STEEL GURU (Feb.
8, 2009), http://www.steelguru.com/sfTCPDF/getPDF/ODE3Mjl=/MrCharles-Chip-Good
year to succeed as CEO of Temasek.html.
214. James Thompson, Temasek Reveals" Surprise Departureof Goodyear, INDEP. (July
22, 2009), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/temasek-reveals-surprise-de
parture-of-goodyear-1755896.html (quoting the official statement of Temasek that the board
and Mr. Goodyear have "concluded and accepted there are differences regarding certain
strategic issues that could not be resolved").
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political elite notwithstanding an extended search to fill the position
and a longstanding relationship between Temasek's chairman and
Goodyear. Others speculated that Goodyear's previous position at
BHP Billiton might have made his appointment a rather poor signal
to China in light of its battle with another Australian mining company, Rio Tinto, at the time. 215 In any event, the Board's attempt to replace Ho Ching failed.
The governance structure of the GIC is, perhaps, even more
revealing of the importance of Singapore's SWFs to the ruling elite.
Similar to Temasek, the GIC is organized as a formal corporation
with management that reports to a board of directors who are, in turn,
elected by shareholders. As with Temasek, however, the sole shareholder is the Ministry of Finance. 216 Thus, as long as the PAP retains
control of the government, it has the power to select all directors.
Additionally, like Temasek, GIC is a Fifth Schedule Company, implying that no director may be appointed or removed without Presidential approval. 217 This "safeguard" also ensures that in the event of
an unexpected loss of parliamentary control, the PAP would still control the board of GIC for at least the remainder of the President's
term.

2 18

As can be seen by the current Board's composition, the PAP
closely supervises the GIC. Lee Kuan Yew served as the Chairman
of GIC from 1981 through 2011 (and still retains a position as a "senior advisor"); he was succeeded by his son Lee Hsien Loong. 219
Among the other eleven directors are the current Ministers of Finance, Trade and Industry, Home Affairs and Education, along with a
former Minister of Finance who had served in that position for six215. In 2009, China arrested executives of Rio Tinto on charges of corruption in the
wake of Rio's refusal to engage in a $23 billion joint venture with China's Cinalco. Given

the importance of China for Singapore's long-term economic prospects, even a remote
association with the Australian mining industry may have damaged Temasek's standing in
China to an unacceptable extent. Mr. Goodyear was, according to some, suddenly an
"unacceptable face of Singapore business." Ian Verrender, Singapore Sling ./br Chip,
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (July 29, 2009), http://www.smh.com.au/business/singapore-

sling-for-chip-20090724-dw5 I.html.
216. GIC, REPORT ON THE MANAGEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT'S PORTFOLIO FOR THE
YEAR 2008/09, at 24 (2009), available at http://www.gic.com.sg/data/pdf/GICReport_
2009.pdf.

217.

Id. at 25.

218. See supra note 193 and accompanying discussion.
219. Lars Klemming, Lee Hsien Loong Named Chairman of G1C, BLOOMBERG NEWS
(May 30, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-31/lee-hsien-loong-namedchairman-of-gic.html.
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teen years and the former second minister of Foreign Affairs. 220 Five
seats are held by current senior managers within GIC and two are
held by senior managers of Temasek-controlled companies. 221 Ang
Kong Hua is the only director with no ties to the PAP who is not currently working for a company controlled by one of Singapore's
SWFs. Overall, eleven of the twelve directors are strongly connected
to the PAP or work for a company the government owns. 222 The career patterns leave the impression that a board position at GIC is a
reward for outstanding (and loyal) services in business or government. This also ensures that GIC's strategies are aligned with the interests of Singapore's elites.
More than governance structures and personnel decisions,
however, the controversy surrounding SWFs and their motives and
strategies is concerned with their actual investment behavior. Temasek has traditionally taken controlling stakes in domestic companies and large minority stakes in regional companies. As discussed,
Temasek's strategy has allowed the PAP to pick winners in the domestic market and foster the development of specific industrial sectors. Temasek began to develop an international profile only over the
past decade. Closer inspection of its regional investments suggests a
similar pattern.
Temasek is highly selective in its choice of regional investments and tends to take relatively large stakes. In fact, governments
in the region often seek out Temasek to become a core investor in industries that require a stable shareholder or to defuse political tension
in their own countries. These investments arguably serve the dual
purposes of generating profits and aligning the interests of potential
regional political rivals (and former enemies).
For example, Temasek invested in several Indonesian banks
220. GIC Board olDirectors, GIC, http://www.gic.com.sg/about/board-of-directors (last
visited Jan 7, 2011) (Lim Hng Kiang, Tharman Shanmugaratnam, Teo Chee Hean and Heng
Swee Keat are currently ministers; Richard Hu Tsu Tau is the former long-serving Minister
of Finance; Raymond Lim Siang Keat is the former second minister of Foreign Affairs;
follow links for information about each individual member).
221. Id. Temasek owns large stakes in DBS Group Holdings Ltd. (twenty-seven
percent) and Singapore Airlines Ltd. (fifty-five percent). See Major Portlblio Companies:
Financial Services, TEMASEK REVIEW 2011 (2011), http://www.temasekreview.com.sg
/portfolio/major financial.html; Major Por/blio Companies:
Transportation and
Industrials, TEMASEK
REVIEW
2011
(2011),
http://www.temasekreview.com.sg

/portfolio/major transport.html.
222.

See GIC, REPORT ON THE MANAGEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT'S PORTFOLIO FOR THE

YEAR 2009/10, at 30-37
/GICReport_2010.pdf.

(2010),

available

at

http://www.gic.com.sg/data/pdf
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in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis when the recapitalization
of banks was of paramount importance to regional political stability.
It now holds substantial minority positions in Alliance Bank (Malaysia) and Bank Danamon (Indonesia), 223 and the host government has
invited it to take positions in Indonesian and Thai telecommunications companies. While Temasek was eventually forced to divest its
stakes in Indonesian telecoms Telkomsel and Indosat due to a controversial anti-trust ruling,2 24 the fact remains that the Indonesian
government specifically invited the initial investment.
Temasek's purchase of a 49.6% stake in Thai telecom company Shin Corporation was supposed to demonstrate Singapore's
ability to assist regional allies by helping then-Prime Minister
Thaksin Shinawatra defuse allegations that his investment and telecommunications policies were aimed at benefiting a company his
family owned. 225 Unfortunately for Temasek and Singapore, this acquisition sparked a "wave of unrest" that eventually resulted in a military coup and the ouster of Thaksin. 226 This episode demonstrates
that even regional investments bear additional political risks relative
to domestic investments. Whereas Temasek benefits from complete
political support inside Singapore, it has little control over changes in
the political winds in other countries. Not surprisingly, Temasek has
treaded more carefully in recent years when investing regionally.
While Temasek's actions are regularly publicized, the GIC
has largely avoided public scrutiny despite managing a larger portfo-

223. Ben Bland, Temasek s Malaysian Governance Problem: What Happened Next,
ASIAN
CORRESPONDENT
(Mar.
12, 2010), http://asiancorrespondent.com/the-asiafile/temasek-s-malaysian-governance-problem-what-happened-next.
224. On November 19, 2007, Indonesia's Commission for the Supervision of Business
Competition (KPPU) announced that it had found Temasek guilty of violating Article 27 of
Indonesia's Competition Law Number 5 of 1999, which prohibits any company from
owning a "majority" of shares in two or more companies that together have more than half
of the market share in any industry. KPPU did so despite the fact that Temasek's
subsidiaries actually held less than half of the shares in each company. See Temasek to
Appeal to Indonesia's Supreme Court, TEMASEK (May 2009), http://www.temasek.com.sg
/pdf/kppu_09may.pdf. The ruling was upheld on appeal to Indonesia's Supreme Court.
Harry Suhartono, Indonesia Court Upholds Anti-Trust Body Ruling on Temasek, REUTERS
(May 9, 2008), available at http://in.reuters.com/article/2008/05/09/temasek-indonesiaverdict-idINJKB9857020080509.
225. Thaksin Cashes in his Chips, ECONOMIST (Jan. 24, 2006), http://www.economist.
com/node/5433987.
226. Wayne Arnold, Ouster of Thaksin Exposes Temasek, INT'L HERALD TRIB. (Sept.
20, 2006), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/20/business/worldbusiness/20ihtsing.2875492.html.
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This is fairly comparable to the situation in Abu Dhabi. The
SWF tasked with investing globally (here, GIC) takes small stakes
that are well below thresholds that would invite scrutiny or trigger
disclosure requirements imposed by foreign regulators. Even on its
own website, GIC discloses only highly aggregated figures describing its portfolio. 228 As mentioned in the previous case studies, this
strategy is autonomy-maximizing because it maximizes the number
of investment opportunities that GIC can pursue without triggering a
political backlash.
It is, of course, true that the general investment patterns of
both Temasek and GIC are consistent with autonomy maximization
or profit maximization. True preferences, however, are often revealed in a crisis. 22 9 Crises are extreme events that may prompt actors to make unusual and economically irrational decisions. Sometimes, however, these decisions reveal deep-seated priorities that are
difficult to discern in normal times when wealth maximization neatly
coincides with political interests. Examining the reactions of Temasek and GIC to several crises over the past decade thus helps to
shed light on their underlying motives.
The first example dates back to 2004, when China Aviation
Oil ("CAO"), a subsidiary of China Aviation Oil Holding Company
("CAOHC"), a large company trading on Singapore's SGX exchange, collapsed. 230 CAO had taken substantial short positions on
oil at a time when prices were increasing relentlessly. Consequently,
it was forced to file for bankruptcy but was reorganized and eventually relisted on the SGX. A closer look at this fairly innocuous chain
of events reveals, however, a complex sequence of interactions between the Chinese and Singaporean governments in which Temasek
played a central role. In a last-minute attempt to rescue CAO, its
lio.227

227. Temasek reported that the market value of its portfolio has recovered from the
financial crisis and rose to a new high of $183 billion in March 2010. Netty Ismail,
Temasek ' Assets Set to Reclaim Peak as Asia Pays Off Bus. WEEK (July 7, 2010), available
at
http://www.theedgesingapore.com/component/content/17550/17550.html?task view&
showall 1. GIC does not disclose its portfolio's value, but it was speculated to be about
$200 billion as of March 31, 2009. Costas Paris and P.R. Venkat, Singapore's GIC's
Port/blio Sut/ers Loss In Fiscal 2009, Dow JONES NEWSWIRES (Sept. 29, 2009),
http:Hsingaporeelection.blogspot.com/2011/04/wsj-singapores-gic-suffers-416-billion.html.
228.

Supra note 216, at 11-12.

229.

For a discussion on using crisis moments to analyze governance regimes, see

generally CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW AND CAPITALISM:

WHAT

CORPORATE CRISES REVEAL ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AROUND
THE WORLD

(2008).

230. For a detailed account of this case, see id. at 125.
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parent company, CAOHC, engaged in insider trading under Singapore's laws. 231 Temasek and the other investors were wiped out
when CAO filed for bankruptcy only weeks later. Singapore's Monetary Authority faced the stark choice of enforcing its insider trading
rules (and assuring foreign investors in particular of its commitment
to strong investor protection) or soft-pedaling in order to protect its
relations with China. 232 In nothing less than a coordinated approach,
the Monetary Authority levied a substantial fine on CAO, but Temasek recapitalized CAO within the week, thereby ensuring CAO's
re-listing on the Singapore stock exchange-an entity in which Temasek indirectly holds a twenty-four percent stake. 233 The events
were quickly followed by an announcement that Temasek had been
chosen as one of two initial investors in the China Construction Bank
(CCB)-a highly anticipated opportunity, given that it was the first
of China's four largest banks to go public. 234 Evidently, by choosing
a middle ground, Temasek preserved its ability to invest in Chinese
companies, thereby maximizing its future range of investment options and its autonomy.
In line with the behavior of KIA and ADIA described above,
both Temasek and GIC took major stakes in struggling banks and investment banks in the midst of the global financial crisis and invested
repeatedly even after booking losses on their original investments.
Temasek acquired a 13.7 percent stake in Merrill Lynch through sub-

231. Two months before CAO filed for bankruptcy, it offered fifteen percent of its
shares in CAO to investors in a private placement but failed to disclose that the funds raised
would be lent to CAO to meet its obligations to the counterparties on its oil futures and
creditors who had provided short-term liquidity. See id. Temasek was one of the lead
investors buying shares in this placement, which was read by other market participants as a
signal of safety despite rumors that CAO was troubled. John Burton, BP and Temasek to
Buy Stake into CAO, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2005), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3d629ef25b4c- 11 da-b221-0000779e2340.html#axzz I abh5SfOH.
232. The importance of China is underscored by the fact that Chinese companies
represent over forty percent of foreign listings on the SGX, Lynette Khoo, China moves pose
IPO challenge fi)r SGX, ASIA ONE BUSINESS (Nov. 4, 2009), http://www.asiaone.com
/Business/News/My+Money/Story/AlStory20091102-177410.html,
and represented the
greatest opportunity for continued SGX growth.
233.

See MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 229, at 125.

234. Temasek to Invest I Billion USD in China Construction Bank, PEOPLE'S DAILY
ONLINE
(July
5,
2005),
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200507/05/eng20050705
_194016.html.
On the sequence of bank privatization in China, see Katharina Pistor,
Banking Refbrmns and Bank Bail Outs in the Chinese Mirror, in CHINA'S TRANSITION TO A
MARKET EcONOMY (Joseph Stiglitz ed., forthcoming 2012) (manuscript available at
http://policydialogue.org/files/events/Pistor-banking reform bail outs.pdf).
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stantial investments in late 2007 and the fall of 2008.235 While Temasek has always maintained that it was investing in Merrill Lynch
because it thought that the company was undervalued (thus protecting its "profit-maximizing" credentials), skepticism is warranted.
Temasek's initial $6 billion investment in December 2007 occurred
at a time when many suspected that western banks were facing substantial impending losses on their subprime loan portfolios. Perhaps
Temasek simply misjudged Merrill's exposure. However, when it became clearer that Merrill was, in fact, facing massive write-downs,
Temasek followed its paper losses with another $6.6 billion to shore
up Merrill's balance sheet. 23 6 Temasek again stepped into the breach
with another $3.4 billion in the fall of 2008 (part of which, however,
was from a $2.5 billion reset payment that was triggered under the
earlier investments when Merrill sold additional shares to other in237
vestors at prices below those for which it had sold to Temasek).
After its shares in Merrill were converted to Bank of America shares
as part of that merger, Temasek closed out its position in early 2009,
resulting in an estimated $4.6 billion loss. 238 Temasek's loss-chasing
behavior cannot be explained by profit-maximizing motivations. It
did, however, help to support the health of the international financial
system, thereby helping to protect the value of Singapore's U.S. dollar-denominated reserves, and demonstrated that Singapore is a cooperative player in the global financial system.
GIC's contributions to the recapitalizations of UBS and
Citigroup during the financial crisis gave it stakes of about eight percent and eleven percent, respectively, in the companies. 239 This, of
course, seems somewhat contrary to its usual low-profile investment
pattern. However, it seems likely that GIC did not expect to actually
take such a substantial stake-or even convert its preferred shares.
Even when the preferred shares dropped in value by eighty percent,
GIC held onto them. However, when the U.S. government indicated
that Citigroup needed to increase its tier one capital reserves, but that
235. Elinor Comlay, Singapore's Temasek Holdings TEM.UL Has Increased its Stake in
Merrill Lynch & Co Inc MER.N to 13. 7% f!om 9.4%, According to a U.S. Regulatory Filing,

REUTERS
(Sept.
30,
/idUSTRE48T4FE20080930.

2008),

available

at

http://www.reuters.com/article

236. Jason Simpkins, Merrill Lynch Turns to Temasek ./r Another Stock Purchase,
Unloads"$31 Billion in CDOs, MONEY MORNING (July 29, 2008), http://moneymrnoming.com/

2008/07/29/merrill-lynch/.
237.

Id.

238.

Costas Paris, Temasek Counts the Cost

'f Merrill Stake, WALL STREET J. ASIA

(May 18, 2009), http:Honline.wsj.com/article/SB124236495798923123.htmnl.
239. See Pistor, supra note 20, at 554 tbl.1, 564.
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converting its own preferred stock was contingent on other investors
following suit, 240 the writing was on the wall. The U.S. government
was implicitly providing support for SWFs to take large stakes in
Citigroup. Conversion of the preferred shares to common shares was
the only viable option for salvaging Citigroup's total common equity
ratio. This also had the benefit of converting GIC's paper loss from
eighty percent to twenty-four percent, 241 but it eliminated GIC's
claim to a seven percent dividend payment. A profit-maximizing investor responsive to short-term shareholders would have either converted or sold off its preferred shares earlier to minimize its paper
losses and the accompanying criticism. A rational long-term investor
(which GIC purports to be) should have continued to hold its preferred shares despite the suspension of dividend payments in order to
eventually benefit from the seven percent dividend, which was temporarily being paid to a trust. GIC, however, delayed the conversion
until it had the tacit support of the U.S. government, thereby signaling its cooperative posture in the global financial system and protecting its future ability to invest in the United States. To avoid ongoing
American regulatory scrutiny, a prompt sell-off to bring ownership
below five percent was required and it occurred. 242 This entire sequence of events is neither consistent with profit maximization nor
with mercantilist theories. Instead, it demonstrates the use of these
funds for autonomy maximizing purposes: they are used for highly
risky investments to signal cooperation and maintain stability, even
when this comes at a substantial economic loss. And contrary to predictions that would follow from mercantilist arguments, they are not
retained to exert future control.
In addition to making stabilizing investments in western
banks, Singapore's SWFs are deeply involved in the Chinese market.
The rise of China is arguably the greatest threat to Singapore's role as
a major economic hub in the Far East and its role as a bridge between
East and West. As China has asserted its own central place in global
finance with the rise of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges,
240.

FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. Louis, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS:

A TIMELINE OF

EVENTS AND POLICY ACTIONS 20, available at http:Htimeline.stlouisfed.org/pdf/CrisisTime

line.pdf (last visited Jan. 7, 2011) ("The conversion is contingent on the willingness of
private investors to convert a similar amount of preferred shares into common equity.").
241. Conrad Tan, GIC Cuts Loss in One Fell Swop [sic], ASIA ONE BUS. (Mar. 2, 2009),
http://www.asiaone.com/Business/News/My /"2BMoney/Story/Al Story2009O3O1-125407
.html.
242. Costas Paris & P.R. Venkat, Singapore's GIC's Portlblio Suijfers Loss in Fiscal
2009, DOw JONES NEWSWIRES, Sept. 29, 2009, available at Factiva, Doc. No.
DJ00000020090929e59t00069.
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Hong Kong and Shanghai are competing
over their share in the list24 3
ing of firms from mainland China.
A striking example of this is when the CCB, the Bank of China and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China ("ICBC") were
partially privatized in 2005 and 2006. Between them, these banks attracted substantial investments from western institutions like Bank of
America, RBS and Goldman Sachs. 244 However, when these institutions came under pressure at home to improve their tier one capital
base, they chose to generate cash by selling off their stakes in the
Chinese banks. As the initial investments were subject to a threeyear lock-in period that expired in early 2009, it looked as if shares in
China's banks would be flooding the market precisely when financial
markets were down, with likely negative repercussions for China's
financial institutions. Government-linked Chinese institutional investors picked up most of the shares western banks sold. This could
have looked like western investors were selling off their low-quality
24 5
assets, thereby damaging the value of the Chinese banks.
However, one major foreign investor, Temasek, also participated.246 At a time when private investors were shying away from
investing in financial institutions, including those in China, Temasek
shouldered the risk once more and signaled to external capital markets that the Chinese banks were still valuable (and not simply being
propped up by the Chinese government through a back channel).
Last, but not least, Temasek also appeared as one of the core investors that backed the IPO in 2010 of the Agricultural Bank of China,
the last of the four major Chinese banks that had been slated for partial privatization. 247 Our theory suggests that Temasek made these
investments in the Chinese financial sector to signal that an independent and largely autonomous PAP is a useful friend for China,
which, in turn, should provide a rationale for China to avoid impinging on the PAP's autonomy.
To summarize, the creation, internal governance structures
and investment patterns of Singapore's SWFs fit our autonomy243. For a discussion of the CAO case to illustrate Singapore's relation to China and
how this relation affects its governance of financial markets, see MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra
note 229.
244.

See Pistor, supra note 20, at 557.

245.

For details on these transactions, see generally Pistor, supra note 234.

246.

Id.

247. Saeed Azhar & Michael Flaherty, Temasek O/iers $300 Million to Invest in ABC
July 1PO, CHINA DAILY (June 14, 2006), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/201006/14/content 9976381.htm.

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[50:1

maximizing theory. Creating the institutions made the government,
rather than individuals, the primary beneficiary of high domestic savings rates, ensuring that the PAP would remain firmly in control of
Singapore's economic development. As discussed, each institution is
clearly controlled by members of the PAP inner circle, and their governance structures ensure that this will remain the case. Extraordinary investments into key foreign financial institutions in both Asia
and the West demonstrated Singapore's value in the international financial system, thereby ensuring that global players will remain engaged in Singapore to provide an implicit security guarantee against
any regional threats. Parallel support for the Chinese and western financial sectors helps to ensure that both will continue to engage with
Singapore rather than leaving it to the other's sphere of influence.
Singapore's SWFs also sometimes act to soften the impact of policies
or actions undertaken by Singapore's government that would adversely affect the interests of these more powerful global actors. The
strategy has proven successful, as Singapore and the PAP have been
able to weather financial crises without incurring any obligations to
outside countries or institutions-all while steadily improving their
own regional security situation.
D. China
In some, but not all, respects, China is an outlier among the
political entities surveyed in this paper. Unlike the Gulf States or
Singapore, China is big-home to the largest population in the
world-and is an emerging global power. Consequently, security
motives do not play such a large role in motivating China's establishment of SWFs. Yet even in this case, the basic argument that
SWFs are instruments designed to maximize the autonomy of ruling
elites both domestically and internationally has substantial traction.
We would like to acknowledge at the outset that among the
political entities discussed herein, China comes closest to acting like
a mercantilist. 248 This fact is apparent in natural resource investments that SWFs and other state-controlled entities in China have
made across the globe. 249 These investments, which are frequently

248.

See generally Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 6.

249. This includes major investments in the financial, infrastructure and natural resource
sectors by the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China ("ICBC"), which is indirectly
owned by CIC (through Hui Jin). See Tom Burgis, China to Extend Africa Acquisitions,
FIN. TIMES (July 30, 2008), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/O/lf7ab242-5e5c-Ildd-b354000077b07658. html#axzzlZjCi8Quj.
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paired with aid to support infrastructure development, are clearly
meant to secure China's access to resources that are indispensable for
the continuing growth of its economy. Nonetheless, not all investments have this overtone. Specifically, the entities that invest China's large foreign exchange reserves, the State Administration for
Foreign Exchange ("SAFE") and China Investment Corporation
("CIC"), seem to pursue a much broader strategy, in which resource
acquisition may play only a minor role.
The continued importance of the government as owner and
manager of economic entities in China makes drawing a clear distinction between what counts as a SWF and what is simply a state-owned
enterprise exceedingly difficult. In fact, the generic definition of
SWFs in the literature, which we have endorsed as well, does not facilitate such a distinction. Some sources list a number of state sponsored funds, including SAFE and CIC as well as China's National
Social Security Fund,
as SWFs, which is entirely consistent with the
250
above definition.
Nonetheless, we will focus for the most part on CIC for two
reasons. First, it is the only entity that has been officially designated
by China as a SWF. 251 It is also the most transparent institution,
which makes an assessment of China's SWF governance structure
and investment strategies much easier. Second, CIC invests both
domestically and internationally. SAFE has also been reported to invest globally, but as an administrative agency, it can do so only
through special investment entities. Apparently, SAFE has established such entities in Hong Kong and has used them to invest in a
252
series of companies that are listed on the London Stock Exchange.
However, very little is known about how much and where SAFE invests China's foreign exchange reserves.
CIC was officially established in the fall of 2007 in response
250. See Mark Konyn, Eyes Stay Focused on China'sSWFs, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2009),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1 1 a93d82-cb07-1 lde-97e0-00144feabdcO.html#axzzlFOVi0zJl.
The article also lists the National Social Security Fund ("NSSF") and the China-Africa
Development Fund (Cad-Fund) as SWFs.
251. The term "sovereign wealth fund" is, of course, a general label of governmentowned investment vehicles. See discussion supra Part II (Theory). The point is that CIC is
a government-owned entity that is designated to invest for the purpose of maximizing
returns for the benefit of its shareholder, i.e., the Chinese government. See CHINA INV.
CORP., http://www.china-inv.cn/cicen/about-cic/aboutcic-overview.html (last visited Jan. 7,
2011).
252. Philip Stafford & Alida Smith, Paper Trail Leads to London Top Stocks, FIN.
TIMES (Sept. 12, 2008), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/O/a9e41266-8062-1ldd-99a9-000077
b07658.html#axzz lZjCi8Quj.
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to growing pressures from the international community, in particular
the United States, to reinvest the rapidly increasing foreign exchange
reserves the country had accumulated. 253 This is highly reminiscent
of the international pressure that triggered the creation of Singapore's
GIC. 254 As it happened, CIC was established at the very moment that
the global financial crisis began to unfold. This was almost certainly
not planned but has left its marks on CIC's early investments abroad.
Formally, CIC is directly under the control of the State Council, China's executive branch of government. Its most powerful
stakeholder, however, is the Ministry of Finance. It provided CIC
with its start-up capital by issuing bonds to the public and handing
over the proceeds so that CIC could acquire foreign exchange from
the People's Bank of China ("PBoC"), China's central bank for its
foreign exchange reserves. 255 Thus, CIC was initially entirely debt
financed. This created a heavy burden on CIC to generate substantial
return on its investments in order to meet monthly interest payments.
This structure proved to be unsustainable, especially in light of the
global financial crisis. By August of 2009, an agreement was struck
to recharacterize the initial capital contribution as equity rather than
debt, thereby eliminating CIC's need to make regular interest payments 256 and establishing it as an entity with no external liabilities.
CIC's official mission is "to make long-term investments that
maximize risk-adjusted financial returns for the benefit of the State,
our shareholder. ' 257 In an attempt to reassure the global public that
this does not entail state control akin to the old socialist model, the
253. See China's Trillion-Dollar Kitty is Ready, ASIA TIMES (Oct. 2, 2007),
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/ChinaBusiness/IJ02CbO .html (referring to the huge foreign
exchange reserves China had already accumulated at that time). China's foreign exchange
reserves have become a contentious issue with the United States, and Treasury Secretary
Timothy Geithner has repeatedly warned that China should work on reducing the reserves to
overcome global imbalances. See, e.g., Timothy Geithner, United States Treasury Secretary,
G-20 Statement (Feb. 2, 2011) (transciprt available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-ce
nter/press-releases/Pages/TG 1073.aspx).
254.

See Pistor, supra note 20.

255.

For a detailed account of CIC's establishment and early investment strategies, see

generally MICHAEL MARTIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL3433, CHINA'S SOVEREIGN WEALTH

FUND (2008); Michael H. Cognato, China Investment
Opportunity?, NBR ANALYSIS, July 2008, at 9.
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Threat
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256. Ouyang Xiaohong & Liu Peng, (IC No Longer to Pay Interest to the State, ECON.
OBSERVER (Aug. 26, 2009), http://www.eeo.com.cn/ens/homepage/briefs/2009/08/26/1493
95.shtml.
257. CHINA INV. CORP., ANNUAL REPORT 2008, at 4 (2008), available at
http://www.china-inv.cn/cicen/include/resources/CIC_2008-annualreport-en.pdf
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report goes on to state:
Our legal framework and governance model require us
to operate as an independent commercial entity in an
environment of sound corporate governance. We are
committed to maintaining excellent professional and
ethical standards in corporate governance, transparency and accountability. We have the full support of our
shareholder to achieve our mission and attain these
goals. 258
This statement is obviously meant to assure the global community about CIC's objectives but does not necessarily give an accurate account of how the entity operates. We therefore scrutinize the
formal governance structure of CIC, the identities of those charged
with running the fund and its investment strategy (or at least as much
of CIC's strategy as can be gleaned from its investments during its
short existence to date). In analyzing the CIC, we find only limited
support for a mercantilist argument and similarly limited support for
CIC's self-proclamation that it is completely driven by risk-adjusted
returns. Many of CIC's international investments are small and passive, indicating that mercantilism is not the driving force behind CIC.
CIC's larger acquisitions can best be explained as reactions to the
global financial crisis-and indicate motives that are not aligned with
maximizing risk-adjusted returns. CIC's refusal to turn its stakes in
global financial institutions into mechanisms of control also indicates
that mercantilism and imperialism are not its primary drivers.
We argue that CIC's investments in global financial institutions during the crisis served to assure other major stakeholders in the
global financial system (especially the United States) that China is a
cooperative player and that it is not using its growing economic and
financial power to control international markets. China's actions at
the time were critical to deflating, at least temporarily, the pressure
on China to abandon its efforts to subsidize export-driven growth
through an undervalued exchange rate.
At present, China's leadership does not see an alternative to
this strategy and is acutely aware of the fact that continued economic
growth is critical for maintaining its hold on power. In fact, during
the crisis, CIC was being used to infuse capital into China's major financial institutions so that they could expand their credit facilities
and prop up the domestic economy, thereby protecting Chinese jobs.
This closely resembles similar practices in Singapore, where Temasek and GIC were also used to insure against a more severe eco258. Id.
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nomic downturn that could have put domestic political pressure on
the country's leadership. It also shows that CIC has been used as an
instrument of monetary policy-which is not exactly within the purview of an investor looking to maximize risk-adjusted returns.
As a limited liability company, CIC's formal governance
structure is similar to the conventional Western corporation. It has a
board of directors that selects and supervises a management team,
and there is some overlap between the two. 259 However, when looking at the actual personnel, it is clear that there is an additional governance system in place that is decidedly "Chinese." Those serving
on CIC's board or as executives were drawn from China's financial
elite-a cohort of financial cadres that has been groomed by the
Communist Party, which ultimately controls their career path. CIC's
chairman of the board of directors and CEO is Lou Jiwei, and the
vice chairman, president and chief investment officer is Gao Xiqing. 260 Both men come with extensive experience in government
services, including in the financial sector. Mr. Lou has previously
held several positions, including those at the State Council, the Ministry of Finance and the State Commission for Restructuring the Economic Systems. 261 Likewise, Mr. Gao has served in the general
counsel's office of China's Securities Regulatory Commission
("SRC") as well as at the National Council for the Social Security
Fund. 262 Indeed, inspection reveals that without exception, every
member of CIC's board of directors, every executive and every
member of its supervisory board has held or concurrently holds key
positions in government, including positions at the PBoC, SAFE, the
Ministry of Finance, regulatory bodies overseeing banking, finance
and securities and at government-controlled financial intermediaries
259. In addition, following the German corporate governance model, Chinese law also
requires a board of supervisors, the members of which may not be executives. For a
comprehensive overview of China's system of corporate governance, see JING
LENG, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REFORM IN CHINA'S TRANSITION ECONOMY

(2009). China is indeed conventionally classified as a civil law country of German origin.
The reasons are largely historical, as in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries

China copied Japanese law, which, in turn, was borrowed primarily from Germany.
However, China's recent legal reforms have been more eclectic and include sourcing from
the United States, Taiwan (itself a German civil law country) and the European Union. For a
summary of the law governing corporate law and securities listings, see generally
Howard Gensler, Company Formation and Securities Listing in the People 's Republic of
China, 17 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 400 (1995).
260. Board of Directors, CHINA INV. CORP., http://www.china-inv.cn/cicen/governance/
governing-bod.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2012).
261.

Id.

262.

Id.
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like Hui Jin Corporation, which holds the government's
stakes in
23
China's major banks and is a subsidiary of CIC. 6
The ubiquity of such cross-placements suggests that the formal governance structure of CIC is deeply embedded in a dense network of personal ties. In contrast to the Gulf states, where personal
ties are formed by kinship relations, or Singapore, where the small
size of the country and its elite facilitates a combination of kinship
and meritocracy, in China the network is maintained by the Organizational Committee of the Communist Party (OCCP). The OCCP
has the power to appoint and dismiss key cadres within China's system of governance not only in politics, but also in the economy and
finance. It governs by controlling human capital. The CCP regularly
updates a rulebook that lists the positions over which it commands
26
control, 2 64 which include positions in top financial intermediaries. 5
The role of the CCP in governing China's financial system is
consistent with our autonomy-maximization theory. The CCP has
asserted its control over the financial sector by way of controlling
appointments to key positions at the very moment that China began
to open the state-controlled sector to private and foreign investors.
As part of China's WTO agreement, it committed to open the financial sector fully to foreign investment by the end of 2006.266 The
likely repercussions of financial liberalization (i.e., the threat to state
control of the economy) were mitigated by two strategies. First, China invited strategic investors to acquire large stakes in major banks
prior to the liberalization deadline in 2006, thereby ensuring that it
267
controlled who would acquire such stakes and on what terms.
These investors entered into three-year lock-up agreements, which
263. See Katharina Pistor, Governing China's Finance, in CAPITALIZING CHINA (Randall
K. Morck & Henry Wai-chung Yeung eds., forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 16 23)
(available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c12073.pdf) (presenting data on personal
networks that link executives and board members of China's financial institutions to key
government agencies and/or other state-controlled entities).
264. For a detailed account of the emergence of this committee, see generally Sebastian
Heilmann, Regulatory Innovation by Leninist Means: Communist Party Supervision in
China's FinancialIndustry, CHINA Q., Mar. 2005, at 1. An earlier version of this rulebook
was translated into English. See generally John P. Bums, Strengthening Central CCP
Control of Leadership Selection: The 1990 Nomenklatura, CHINA Q., June 1994, at 458.
265.

See Pistor, supra note 20, at 554 tbl. 1.

266. For an early prediction of the likely impact of financial liberalization, see John P.
Bonin & Yiping Huang, Foreign Entry into Chinese Banking: Does WTO Membership
Threaten Domestic Banks?, 25 WORLD ECON. 1077 (2001).
267. For details of the bank privatization strategy in China, see generally Pistor, supra
note 234.
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ensured that these arrangements would extend well beyond the liberalization deadline of 2006. Second, the CCP asserted its control
rights over the financial sector by creating the OCCP to oversee the
recruitment of financial cadres to key positions in finance-including
268
at large banks that had just been partially privatized.
These strategies can be interpreted as mercantilist, but they
also reflect an attempt by the CCP to control a sector that is vital for
managing the economy and ensuring continuous growth. In a country where political accountability is absent, delivering growth has become the most important source of the ruling elite's legitimacy. China has become adept at camouflaging its real governance structure by
adopting elements of "good governance" from the West. Incorporating CIC as a limited liability company was the first step in this direction. In addition, CIC has assembled an international advisory board
that includes former World Bank president Jim Wolfenson, former
chief economist at the World Bank Nicholas Stern, former member
of the WTO's appellate body and professor at Columbia's School of
International Public Affairs ("SIPA") Merit Janow and Vice Chancellor of the Chinese University of Hong Kong Lawrence Lau. The only member with a specific financial background is Taizo Nishimuro
of Japan, who heads the Tokyo Stock Exchange Group. 269 Clearly,
the recruitment of these international dignitaries 270 is meant to assure
outsiders that CIC is playing by the rules of international corporate
governance and to deflect demands for the actual allocation of control rights, which in China lie mostly beyond formal legal structures. 27 1
CIC's investment strategy is bifurcated into domestic and international investments with slightly more than fifty percent of its initial capital of U.S.$200 billion assigned for foreign investment. 272 A
268.

See Heilmann, supra note 264.

269. For details of all members of CIC's International Advisory Council, see CHINA
INV. CORP. ANNUAL REPORT 2008, supra note 257, at 24-25.
270. The practice of recruiting dignitaries to company boards in fact resembles that of
newly formed corporations in nineteenth century England, when members of the aristocracy
were recruited to serve on company boards. See RANDE W. KOSTAL, LAW AND ENGLISH
RAILWAY CAPITALISM (1994) (describing corporate governance practices in the 1830s and
'40s).
271. See generally Pistor, supra note 263 (comparing formal and informal means of
governing China's financial system).
272.

MICHAEL MARTIN, CHINA'S SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND (2008). Note, however, that

according to recent press reports, two separate entities may be formed-one for domestic
and one for international investments. See Chen Dujuan, China Plans To Restructure its
Sovereign Wealth Fund, GLOBAL TIMES (Sept. 2, 2011), http://www.global
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large chunk of the capital designated for domestic acquisition was
spent on the acquisition of Hui Jin Investment Corporation, a government-owned entity that was previously established to manage the
273
government's controlling stakes in China's largest banks.
Although CIC is the parent of Hui Jin, it does not have the authority to appoint Hui Jin's board. The State Council-subject to the
274
approval of the OCCP-makes appointments to the Hui Jin Board.
Moreover, management operations of the two entities are strictly separated. The picture that emerges from these interlocking (rather than
hierarchical) boards of directors is one where a central agent-here,
the CCP and its OCCP-controls the most important resource for the
financial sector: human capital. With the help of party organs 275 that
ensure that top management personnel at partially privatized banks
have spent at least some time working for the Ministry of Finance,
the People's Bank of China or another state agency, the CCP maintains its grip on the financial sector, and CIC is a central part of this
2 76
regime.
This background is also critical when assessing CIC's international investments. CIC made its first major international investment
in May 2007, months before the SWF was officially launched. It acquired a ten percent stake in Blackstone, which reorganized into a
limited partnership structure and launched its IPO just before the onset of the global financial crisis. The units CIC acquired confer no
voting rights, and CIC opted not to appoint any representatives to the
board.2 77 The investment suffered a substantial loss when the finan-

times.cn!NEWS/tabid/99/iD/673705/China-plans-to-restructure-its-sovereign-wealthfund.aspx.
273. See Pistor, supra note 263 (manuscript at 9). Hui Jin is now apparently slated to
become an independent entity again. See Chen, supra note 272.
274. See Pistor, supra note 263 (manuscript at 9). See also Hui Jin's description of its
governance structure on its web page:
The Company shall establish its Board of Directors, which shall consist of not
less than five (5) directors. The Board shall have one Chairman, who shall be
the Company's legal representative. All directors shall be appointed by the
State Council. The term of office of a director is three (3) years, and a director
may be re-appointed.
Articles

of Association (Abstract), CENTRAL

HUIJIN

INV.

LTD.

(Oct.

1, 2011),

http://www.huijin-inv.cn/hjen/governance/governance-2008.html?varl =Governance
(emphasis added).
275.

See generally Heilmann, supra note 264.

276. See also Pistor, supra note 263 (manuscript at 18 19) (describing the dense
network and the central role of the CCP in this network).
277. See id.
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cial crisis unfolded, as the price of Blackstone's units plummeted.
Nonetheless, CIC has held on to these shares and in fact has elected
Blackstone to be one of the key managers of its own assets. 278 This
suggests that CIC invested in Blackstone not primarily to earn profits
but rather to secure access to expertise and human capital. By securing a successful IPO of Blackstone, they created a long-term relationship that gives CIC access to management expertise and builds loyalty with one of the most sophisticated groups of financial experts from
the West. These relational ties can be interpreted as an extension of
China's domestic governance regime for finance: control through
human resource management rather than formal ownership rights
with the goal of stabilizing the system and the powers that control it.
CIC's second major investment occurred later in 2007, at a
time when the global financial system already showed serious signs
of distress. In December of 2007, CIC acquired the equivalent of a
nine percent stake in Morgan Stanley in the form of convertible units
at a nine percent interest rate. 279 The difference in the structure of
this investment as compared to the one in Blackstone six months earlier suggests that by late 2007, the riskiness of investing in prominent
financial intermediaries from the West was apparent to all investors,
including CIC. This does not mean that CIC could have foreseen the
scale of the crisis, but it does suggest that it was not a naive, inexperienced investor that simply made a bad investment decision. Not
only was the nine percent interest rate above prevailing market rates,
but it had also become apparent that private investors had lost interest
in these financial intermediaries. 280 Just like other SWFs, CIC assumed a critical role as an investor of penultimate resort (the final resort investment was duly left to the financial intermediaries' home
central banks). Indeed, CIC stood ready for another rescue operation
of Morgan Stanley in September of 2008, when the company found
itself on the verge of collapse following the bankruptcy of Lehman
Brothers. Press reports at the time revealed that CIC considered buying as much as a forty-nine percent stake in the company. 281 In the
278. Rick Carew & Jenny Strasbourg, C1C Turns to Friends: Morgan, Blackstone,
WALL ST. J., July 31, 2009, at 20.
279.

China's ( IC Ploughing $1.2 Billion into Morgan Stanley (CNBC television

broadcast June 3, 2009).
280. See generally Pistor, supra note 20 (discussing how private investors fled markets
at the onset of the global financial crisis).
281. James Quinn, Morgan Stanley Talks to Suitors but Goldman Says It's Business as
Usual, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 18, 2008), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/
banksandfinance/2985030/Morgan-Stanley-talks-to-suitors-but-Goldman-says-its-businessas-usual.html.
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end, the transaction did not come through-most likely because both
sides feared political obstacles, which would have delayed the rescue
operation. Indeed, the investments SWFs had made in 2007 and early 2008 had created a political backlash in the United States and triggered a review of rules governing the political review of foreign investments. 28 2 Similarly, CIC faced major criticism at home for its
substantial losses on its earlier investments in Blackstone and Morgan Stanley. 28 3 In the end, Mitsubishi UFJ of Japan acquired a twenty percent stake, and subsequently the U.S. government acquired another twenty-five percent stake. However, less than a year later, CIC
acquired another forty-seven million shares (at an undisclosed price)
to help Morgan Stanley repay the funds it had received from the U.S.
government, thereby regaining its status as a fully private entity 284
(if
one discounts the fact that these stakes were now held by a SWF).
Interestingly, Morgan Stanley was later selected as28another
key asset
5
investments.
overseas
CIC's
managing
for
manager
Comparing CIC's investments in Blackstone and Morgan
Stanley suggests an emergent pattern. There is little indication that
CIC is seeking to control foreign financial intermediaries it invests in
(i.e. engaging in mercantilism or imperialism in the financial sector).
Instead, it is building long-term, reciprocal relations. At this point in
time, CIC still needs foreign expertise to confront the vagaries of
global financial markets. The foreign intermediaries were, in turn,
282.

The rules, finalized in November 2008, already cast a shadow on ongoing

transactions. Most important was the Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions, and

Takeovers by Foreign Persons; Final Rule, 31 C.F.R. § 800 (2008). The rules broadened the
definition of "control" by a foreign entity, which was expanded to mean,
the power, direct or indirect, whether or not exercised, and whether or not
exercised or exercisable through the ownership of a majority or a dominant
minority of the total outstanding voting securities of an issuer, or by proxy

voting, contractual arrangements or other means, to determine, direct or decide
matters affecting an entity; in particular, but without limitation, to determine,
direct, take, reach or cause decisions regarding (1) The sale, lease, mortgage,
pledge or other transfer of any or all of the principal assets of the entity,
whether or not in the ordinary course of business; (2) The dissolution of the
entity; (3) The closing and/or relocation of the production or research and
development facilities of the entity; (4) The termination or non-fulfillment of
contracts of the entity; or (5) The amendment of the Articles of Incorporation
or constituent agreement of the entity with respect to the matters described at
paragraph (a) (1) through (4) of this section.
Id. at § 800.204.

283. Bill Powell, Why China Won't Come to the Rescue, TIME (Sept. 19, 2008),
http://www.time.com/time/ business/article/0,8599,1842754,00.html.
284284.

Wang Xu, CIC Increases Stake in Morgan Stanley, CHINA DAILY (June 3, 2009),

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-06/03/content_7978689.htm.
285.

See Carew & Strasbourg, supra note 278.
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dependent on capital that few private investors, if any, were supplying during the global financial crisis. By extending domestic patterns
of control over human capital to global markets, CIC is creating a
critical bridge between China's domestic financial governance regime and its relation to global markets. The motive for this strategy
is not primarily financial. In fact, the very purpose of investing globally is to reduce China's current holdings of foreign exchange reserves, and in light of the magnitude of these holdings (over 3 trillion dollars as of June 30, 2011),286 the return on any of CIC's
investments is likely to be trivial. Instead, the bridge serves the critical function of ensuring that the CCP has some tools at its disposal to
manage global financial markets and mitigate any shocks that might
emanate from them and create a challenge to its hold on power.
Outside the financial sector, CIC has invested extensively in
sectors that supply China with critical resources. They include a
twenty percent stake in GCL-Poly Energy Holdings Limited, 287 a
seventeen percent stake in the Canadian mining company Teck Resources, 288 a fifteen percent stake in AES (U.S.) 2 8 9 and an eleven percent stake in the Kazakh gas company KazMunaiGas. 290 These investments are consistent with a mercantilist interpretation but also fit
our theory. Since the future of the CCP as China's ruling party is directly linked to its ability to deliver growth and ensure employment
for an additional six million people who enter the Chinese workforce
on an annual basis, 291 securing natural resources is a means to serve
both ends: external and internal control.
In general, filings with the SEC show that CIC has invested in
numerous companies in the United States and elsewhere, but in most
286. FAQ on Foreign Exchange Reserves, STATE ADMIN. OF FOREIGN EXCH. (July 28,
2011), http://www.safe.gov.cn/model safe en/news-en/new-detail-en.jsp?ID 3010000000

0000000,313&id=2.
287. China Investment Corporation Invests in GCL-Poly Energy Holdings Limited,
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND INST. (Nov. 19, 2009), http://www.swfinstitute.org/sovereign-wea
Ith-funds/china-investrnent-corporation-invests-in-gcl-poly-energy-holdings-imited/.
288. Teck ResourcesAnnounces C$1.74 Billion Private Placement, SOVEREIGN WEALTH
FUND INST. (July 3, 2009), http://www.swfinstitute.org/sovereign-wealth-funds/teck-resou
rces-announces-cl-74-billion-private-placement/.
289. China Investment Corporation Invests in AES Corporation, SOVEREIGN WEALTH
FUND INST. (Nov. 8, 2009), http://www.swfinstitute.org/sovereign-wealth-funds/china-invest
ment-corporation-invests-in-aes-corporation/.
290. See ChinaInvestment Corporation,SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND INST. (Oct. 1, 2011),
http://www.swfinstitute.org/swfs/china-investment-corporation/.
291. The number was suggested to one of us in a private conversation with a top official
at CIC. Confidential notes from meeting with CIC official (on file with the authors).
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cases has only taken small minority stakes. They offer little evidence
for the proposition that CIC is on an acquisition spree
with the intent
292
of controlling major companies in the United States.
In interpreting CIC's investment strategies, it is important to
realize that China itself has become deeply dependent on the global
financial system. This implies that China has become vulnerable to
the volatility of global markets, which in and of itself is a threat to a
system that is poised to maintain political and economic stability.
Against this background, CIC's actions appear less as an aggressive
foreign acquisition strategy and instead as an attempt to help buffer
the impact of global markets. It does so by using its resources to help
mitigate the fallout from the global financial crisis and to limit the
impact of vast fluctuations in the price of resources and commodities
that are critical to the Chinese economy. As the CCP's legitimacy
inside China (and perhaps even in the international context) is largely
dependent on its ability to ensure continued economic growth, CIC's
efforts to mitigate China's vulnerability to the international marketplace (and thereby sustain its economy in times of crisis) can be
viewed as maximizing the autonomy of the CCP. Within China, if
the economy is stable (as the CIC is trying to ensure), there are fewer
competing claims against the party for political influence. In the international context, cooperation from the CIC in stabilizing financial
markets (and in rebalancing currency reserves) demonstrates that the
CCP is a potentially trustworthy counterparty and reduces the salience of competing accounts of the CCP's merit in the international
system (such as criticisms of its role in human rights abuses, etc.).
Viewed in this light, China's preeminent SWF also fits our autonomy
maximization theory.
IV. CONCLUSION

A widely accepted definition of SWFs holds that these entities are government-owned and -controlled, and have no outside beneficiaries or liabilities beyond the government itself, so they are responsive to the expressed interests and objectives of the government.
There are competing conceptions of what constitutes "governmental
interest" in a democratic society, but a discussion of public choice vs.
public interest politics is beyond the scope of this article. This article
292. See Rick Carew, What CIC Disclosures Say About Its Strategy, WALL ST. J. (Feb.
9,
2010),
http:Honline.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487041820045750549036255
20956.html. But see Steven Mofson, In SEC Filing, China Reveals Vast U.S. Holdings,
WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2010, at A13, for a more alarmist view on CIC's disclosures.
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suggests that in political entities without electoral democracy, such as
China, Singapore, Kuwait and Abu Dhabi, the government is comprised of ruling elites who are not directly accountable to the public
in general: it is easy to see how "governmental interest" becomes
tied to the interests of the ruling elite. Indeed, the internal governance structures of the SWFs themselves ensure that SWF management is directly accountable to the ruling elite in each sovereign
sponsor. Consequently, it is unsurprising that SWFs can be, and are,
wielded to advance the interests of those elites. First and foremost
among these interests is the maintenance of their privileged position.
The task of maximizing autonomy is, however, complex. The
privileged position of ruling elites in non-democratic countries is dependent on domestic stability, security of the state against foreign rivals and the maintenance of substantial autonomy relative to superpowers to which they might otherwise be vulnerable. Without
domestic stability, elite status is fragile and will last only until the
next coup or mass uprising; a foreign invasion would topple existing
elites or at least subsume them into a hierarchy with foreigners at the
top. Finally, as autonomy relative to superpowers decreases, the ability to direct state action towards benefiting the elite is restricted and
domestic legitimacy may be threatened.
As is revealed by the detailed case studies presented in this
paper, SWFs are well suited to serving an autonomy-maximizing
function in the domestic arena. The creation of a SWF ensures that
wealth stays under the control of the ruling elite rather than passing
into the hands of the population as a whole. In the Gulf, the extraction and sale of oil could transform a royally monopolized resource
into dispersed wealth, but concentrating the resultant revenues into a
SWF ensures continued royal control. In Asia, export-led growth
could increase the purchasing power of the domestic population, but
sterilizing the returns by concentrating them in a SWF protects
against destabilizing currency crises and the rise of new wealthy classes that might challenge the existing elite for political control of the
state. Further, once accumulated in a SWF, wealth can be strategically deployed in the domestic market to protect the status of elites. It
can be used to "buy off' potential political rivals, expand the institutional space for political allies (increasing the benefits of aligning
oneself with the existing elite) and to fund social programs that satisfy the needs of the population as a whole for the foreseeable future.
Finally, SWFs ensure that domestic stabilization strategies can be
maintained even in the face of shocks to the system like oil price or
production declines or falling trade volumes. Collectively, these effects substantially improve domestic stability. Indeed, as we have
shown, several SWFs have used their resources in the global crisis
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and subsequently in the political uprisings in the Middle East to appease potential opponents at home.
SWFs are equally well suited to maximizing autonomy in the
international context by improving state security and mitigating the
impact of volatile global markets on the domestic economy. First,
administering wealth through the public sector rather than funneling
it to the private bank accounts of the ruling class (as is done in a substantial number of resource-rich countries) legitimizes the sovereign
sponsor government in the eyes of the international community. In
terms of the particulars of administering the fund, SWF investment
decisions can also be made to directly induce potential threats to state
security not to attack or to convince a third party to guarantee the security of the state. Even without such a direct bargain, deploying
capital in other countries creates economic ties that discourage confrontation and creates relationships that provide leverage in times of
crisis.
SWFs can also be used to maintain substantial autonomy relative to superpowers-whether the United States, as discussed in the
case of the Gulf States in particular, or China in the case of Singapore-that might otherwise exert pressure to limit the sovereign
sponsor's range of viable domestic policy choices. This is relevant in
particular for small countries that cannot effectively maintain their
own external security. First, SWFs diversify the revenue stream of
the sovereign sponsor, insulating against the effects of changes in the
terms of trade or other exogenous shocks, such as commodity price
fluctuations. Maintaining foreign-currency-denominated assets also
decreases vulnerability to currency crises, which effectively increases
the range of available domestic policy choices in the long term. Further, SWF investments can be directed toward injecting capital or liquidity into the economies of superpowers during their own periods
of crisis, with the expectation that this assistance will be remembered
during future interactions. SWFs can also be used to fulfill unspoken
"dollar-recycling" obligations that, if unmet, might lead to interventions by Western countries. Finally, SWFs can also be used to secure
access to natural resources or markets for primary exports, ensuring
the long-term viability of current industrial policy in sovereign sponsors and providing insurance against protectionism in developed
countries.
More recently, SWFs have become an important force in
global financial relations, not primarily because of their size, which is
still dwarfed by private investment vehicles, but because of their ability and willingness to invest at times when private investors take
flight. These investments have given rise to a series of interpreta-
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tions. Some have stressed the potential danger that these "neomercantilist" organizations may pose to the capitalist system. Others
have painted a more positive picture by suggesting that SWFs could
help enhance global social welfare by investing their resources to
spur development in less-developed countries, or to invest in green
293
technology in an attempt to save the planet from climate change.
In contrast, this paper suggests that these investments, too, are best
understood as part of a general strategy aimed at autonomy maximization. SWFs have invested widely in the global financial system
and are as such dependent on it. Their willingness to step in when
private investors took flight is therefore not without self-interest. In
addition, by helping to stabilize global finance they were able to either confirm existing relations of reciprocity or establish similar relations. As discussed in the case studies, the financial crisis created an
opportunity for the Gulf States to reciprocate the security umbrella
the United States has offered them in the past. For China, the crisis
created an opening to position itself not only as a challenge to U.S.
dominance, but as a relational player.
The actual context in which SWFs were established and operate, we suggest, is crucial for understanding their role and the attractiveness of various investment opportunities at any given point in
time. Modeling SWFs according to the standard accounts of state
control over economic activities, which are derived primarily from
the historical experience of the West, misses these critical aspects,
and is therefore bound to miss the critical determinants of SWF behavior both domestically and internationally.

293. For a discussion of SWFs as potential agents of development, see Javier Santiso,
Sovereign Development Funds': FinancialActors in the Shiffing Wealth qfNations, in NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON SOVEREIGN ASSET MANAGEMENT 173 (Malan Reitveld ed., 2008); for a
discussion of their potential role in green technology, see James Lamont, Norwegian State
Fund in $4bn Green Push, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2009, at 20.
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ANNEX-FIGURES AND CHARTS

Figure 1: Equity Transitions among Abu Dhabi's SWFs

